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INTRODUCTION 
There is a general principle of international law that whenever 
a Sovereign state "acquires" (by conquest, cession by a Treaty 
or otherwise) a territory the inhabitants of the territory lose 
existing rights and only have rights recognised in law by the 
1 
new Sovereign. The general principle was explained in the 
following terms by Lord Dunedin in the Privy Council case of 
Yajesingi Joravarsingji and Others v Secretary of State for 
2 
India in Council; 
II When a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for 
the first time that is an act of state. It matters not how 
the acquisition has been brought about. It may be by 
conquest, it maybe by cession following a Treaty, it may be 
by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a 
recognised ruler, in all cases the result is the same. Any 
inhabitant of the territory can make good in the municipal 
courts established by the new sovereign only such rights as 
that sovereign has, through his officers recognised. Such 
rights as he had under rule of predecessors avail him 
nothing. Nay more, even if in a Treaty of cession it is 
stipulated that certain inhabitants should enjoy certain 
rights that does not give a title to those inhabitants to 
enforce those stipulations in municipal courts. The right 
to enforce remains only with the high contracting parties 
II 
For the general principle see e.g., Lord McNair, The Law 
Treaties, Oxford, 1961 pp 78-110; Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v 
Aotea District Maori Land Board (1941) NZLR 590, 597. 
of 
2 (1924] LR 51 Ind App 357, 360. In that case three Naiks 
sought, on appeal from the High Court a declaration that they 
were the proprietors of the whole lands in a specific area and 
that they were not bound to accept a lease in the terms offered 
to them by the Government given that there was a Treaty of 
Cession between the Maharaja and the British Government stating 
that rights under such leases should continue. The appeal was 
dismissed largely on the grounds that a Treaty of Cession could 
not provide the basis for enforcing rights in a municipal court 
unless the principles of the Treaty had been incorporated in 
the municipal law. 
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2 
So far as treaties of cession are concerned the effect of the 
general principle is that even if it is provided in such a 
Treaty that inhabitants should enjoy specific rights that does 
not mean that the Treaty is legally effective/judiciable unless 
through statute, or some other way, the legislative, 
administrative and judicial branches of government are given 
3 
the necessary legal power to implement the Treaty. 
While it has been argued in the past, and is still argued by 
some, that the Treaty of Waitangi was not a Treaty of Cession, 
it is now generally accepted by the Courts that the Treaty is 
4 
one of cession. Moana Jackson is amongst those who maintain 
that the Treaty was not one of cession and consequently that 
5 
Maori retained the right to self-government. In his recent 
report on the "Maori and the Criminal Justice System" Moana 
argued that the fact that the Treaty was an affirmation of 
aboriginal rights rather than a cession of sovereignty was 
reflected in Article Two of the Treaty which guaranteed "te 
tino rangatiratanga", the right to self government. The 
maintenance of the right to self government provided a basis 
for further arguing that Maori should retain the right to self 
development generally and in the Criminal Justice System 
6 
specifically. 
Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties pp 78-79; Te Heuheu 
(supra). 
4 Acceptance that the Treaty was one of cession seen in Nfili 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General (1987) ; NZLR 641; 
Waitangi Tribunal Reports; 2 Muriwhenua Fishing Report; .Thg 
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, April 
1989, pp 12-15 (Chief Judge ETJ Durie) 
5 The Maori and the Criminal Justice System - A New 
Perspective - He Whaipaanga Hou, Moana Jackson, Department of 
Justice Policy and Research Division, November 1988 
6 The right to self development has been regarded as a 
requirement of "te tino rangatiratanga" i.e., article II has 
been regarded as guaranteeing "the continuation of Maori 
Sovereignty, the exercise of Maori control and power over their 
lands, homes, estates, valued possessions and institutions". 
See also The Bill of Rights and Te Tiriti O Waitangi, Shane 
Jones, Legal Research Foundation Seminar, University of 
Auckland August 1985 page 209, 211 Royal Commission on Social 
Policy Volume III Part I page 150 and pages 163 - 171. 
3 
Irrespective of whether the Treaty is one of cession or, for 
example, one of acquisition the legal consequences were the 
7 
same insofar as the English law was said to prevail. 
According to the general principle relating to treaties of 
cession the Treaty of Waitangi has to be incorporated into 
municipal law for it to be effective. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the degree to which the New 
Zealand situation is required to comply with this principle in 
order that the Treaty of Waitangi can have a position in Public 
Law. The consideration of this matter necessarily involves a 
general overview of the Treaty's historical position, its 
present position, and making some assessment of how it has come 
to its present position. Specific matters discussed are the 
Law Commission Report on Fisheries, March 1989 pp 54-56. 
One of the arguments for New Zealand being a settled rather 
than a ceded colony, as expressed in Wi Parata v Bishop of 
Wellington [1877] 3NZLR 72, was that the Treaty was not such at 
International law because Maori were not "competent" to enter 
international relationships. Consequently New Zealand was 
acquired by annexation and a consequence of that was that 
British Common law automatically extended to New Zealand on 
acquisition of sovereignty and this was confirmed by the 
English Laws Act 1858. 
As indicated in the Law Commission report (pages 56 - 57) this 
view has been superceded in recent years and there are strong 
arguments for the view that: 
.... the Treaty .... was a valid treaty of cession in 
terms of a common understanding of international 
law both then and now. 
that regardless of its status at international law 
the Treaty was a valid act of cession in British 
Constitutional law and therefore capable of making 
New Zealand a ceded rather than a settled colony 
(though in terms of the reception of English law 
the practical consequences were the same). 
that the common law itself, in its application to 
British territories, however acquired, recognised 
the land and related rights of native peoples as a 
legal qualification .... The Treaty was no more 
than declarations in this respect, and Maori 
property rights did not and need not derive from 
the Treaty. This is the concept of aboriginal 
title .... Maori property rights continued to exist 
unless and until legislation took them away". 
4 
degrees to which the general principle is still applicable; 
whether the Treaty is in fact part of municipal law and whether 
it is necessary for the Treaty to be part of municipal law in 
order for it to be effective. 
5 
I GENERAL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Historians, lawyers and others interested in Treaty issues are 
8 
generally agreed that the "fortunes" of the Treaty since 1840 
can be divided into significant periods, although the dividing 
lines between these periods, and the relevance ascribed to 
them, is somewhat fluid according to the nature of the Treaty 
issues being considered, whether the perspective is a Maori or 
Pakeha one and the views of the person making the 
categorisation. Claudia Orange, for example, has referred to 
the following three periods as being significant: 
"l. the 1840 to 1870 period when the Treaty 
served a European need for peaceful 
settlement and a Maori need for reassurance 
that certain rights would be honoured. 
2. the 1870 to 1930 period when European New 
Zealand suffered a loss of memory over the 
Treaty, whereas for Maori New Zealand the 
Treaty assumed an increasing relevance. 
8 C. Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi - A Historical Overview, 
Public Sector Volume II No 4 page 2. 
6 
3. the 1930's to the 1980's when there has been 
a rediscovery of the Treaty by Pakeha New 
Zealanders and a continuing and more 
articulate assertion of their Treaty rights 
9 
by Maori New Zealand" 
While such a categorisation necessarily has its limitations, 
paricularly in so far as it fails to give adequate weight to 
most recent developments, it provides a useful framework within 
10 
which more specific analysis can take place. To some degree 
the role of the Treaty in Public Law necessarily reflects the 
same "Treaty Fortunes" categories although in other respects 
the diverging lines of authority that developed within these 
.I.Q..ict.; see also Advisory Committee on Maori perspective for 
social welfare categories in submissions to Royal Commission on 
Social Policy page 148 - 149: 
" .... following 1840 during which Maori iwi controlled their 
own transformation, managed their own economy and set about 
the development of their own institutions; change was 
dramatic. The 1850's saw the beginning of the development 
of dominant Pakeha institutions .... 
Between 1895 and the late 1930"s, the government's Maori 
policy was a curious blend of assimilation, paternalism, 
integration and exploitation." 
See also general overview at pp 144-160; Muriwhenua Waitangi 
Tribunal report categories; Historical overviews in Te Weehi y 
Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] lNZLR 680 and Huakina v 
Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2NZLR 188. Waitangi : Maori 
and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi (1989) Edited 
by IH Kawharu, page x comments that the statement that the 
Treaty was a legal "nullity" " .... blew the Treaty into a 
judicial limbo for the better part of a century" CF Orange, 
Claudia, The Treaty of Waitangi (1987) 187. 
10 The limitations of C Orange's categorisation are discussed 
further in Part V of this paper "How did the Treaty come to 
have its present position?" In particular the categorisation 
does not appear to acknowledge the growing endorsement of the 
doctrine of aboriginal title, the acceptance of the Maori right 
to self determination and the acceptance of the importance of 
the principles of the Treaty as opposed to the Treaty itself 
(by the legislature, courts and others). Other factors 
increasing the Treaty's profile include the fact that Maori 
have always pleaded the Treaty, the Labour Government, until 
recently, has had a "positive" approach, the Waitangi Tribunal 
has provided a strong forum, increased awareness of 
international developments favouring indigenous peoples rights. 
7 
periods means that such classifications must be qualified. On 
the one hand it is possible to look at statutes and case law 
and say, for example, that during the 1870 to 1830 period they 
reflect the fact that there was a loss of memory over the 
Treaty. The decision of Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington 
(1877] 3NZLR 72 reflects this view. On the other hand the 
kauwaeranga judgment (1870; reported in (1984) 14VUWLR 227) 
supports the view that the Treaty of Waitangi was effective to 
create rights; that it was part of the "bedrock" of the New 
11 
Zealand legal system. 
The Wi Parata case arose from the fact that the Ngatitoa tribe 
(who dwell principally in the Porirua District) gave land at 
Witireia to a church as an endowment for a school and while the 
Bishop gave an undertaking that the school would be opened 
forthwith the trust was not executed for thirty years and the 
Crown subsequently made a grant of the land to the bishop of 
Wellington (for a college at Porirua) without the knowledge or 
consent of the tribe. While the tribe no longer desired the 
execution of the trust because it had dispersed and diminished 
in number it sought declarations to the effect that the land 
should be returned to the Ngatitoa tribe. 
In the course of reaching his conclusion that the Ngatitoa 
tribe had no rights to the land at issue Prendergast CJ 
concluded, interalia, that the Treaty of Waitangi so far as it 
purported to cede sovereignty had to be regarded as a simple 
nullity because no body politic existed capable of making 
cession of sovereignty and nor could such a body exist: 
11 
" .... In the case of primitive barbarians, the 
supreme executive government must acquit itself, as 
best it may, of its obligation to respect native 
proprietary rights, and of necessity must be the 
sole arbiter of its own justice. Its acts in this 
particular can not be examined or called in 
A Frame "Kauwaeranga Judgement" [1984] NZLJ 227. 
8 
question by any tribunal, because there exist no 
known principles whereon a regular adjudication can 12 
be based". 
"So far as the proprietary rights of the natives 
are concerned, the so called Treaty merely affirms 
the rights and objectives which, jure gentium, 
vested in and devolved upon the Crown under the 
13 
circumstances of the case". 
In the kauwaeranga case Chief Judge Fenton was required to 
decide whether Hoterene Taipari and others should be granted 
the certificate of title to a piece of land which was covered 
by the high water of ordinary tides but left by the water as 
the tide receded. While the Crown argued that English law 
should determine the matter, and that by English law the 
foreshore belonged to the Crown and could only be held subject 
to grant from the Crown, Fenton J considered that the matter 
had to be determined on the basis of the uniqueness of the New 
Zealand situation arising from the existence of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. 
Specific issues Fenton J considered needed addressing were 
firstly whether Maori had any right of ownership, and if so 
what right, to the mudflat at issue in 1840; and secondly 
whether the cession of sovereignty of the land destroyed the 
14 
right or title that had previously existed. In the course 
of reaching his conclusion that while the applicants were not 
entitled to the absolute property in the soil of the foreshore 
they were entitled to the exclusive right of fishing and using 
13 
14 
[1877] 3NZLR 38, 72 
A Frame "kauwaeranga Judgement'' [1984] NZLJ 227 
9 
for the purposes of fishing the surface of the soil of all the 
portion of the foreshore between the high water mark and the 
low water mark Fenton CJ summarised the issues to be considered 
in the following terms: 
"Was the land now claimed, at the date of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, land or a fishery collectively 
or individually possessed by aboriginal natives? 
For if it was, the full, exclusive and undisturbed 
possession thereof is confirmed and guaranteed to 
the possessors by the Crown of England. And this 
fact is clearly proved. We must seek then in the 
Treaty itself for the true solution of our problem 
and it only remains now to inquire whether cession 
of sovereignty of the island to her Majesty has the 
effect of destroying the Crowns guarantee and the 
first idea that naturally suggests itself, is that 
this guarantee was the main consideration for the 
cession. And I do not see how one part of an 
instrument, of which the intention is clear, can be 
held thus to destroy another part, unless there is 
irreconcilable conflict and here there is no 
conflict. In England, where the whole soil of 
their country fell to the King by conquest .... 
large portions of the foreshore are owned in fee 
15 
simple absolutely by private persons". 
1.hid, 239 
10 
It is quite clear from the above passage and the judgement as a 
whole that Fenton J considered that the Treaty was effective to 
create rights and he went on to explain the uniqueness of the 
New Zealand situation in the following terms: 
"There is probably no case of a colony founded in 
precisely the same manner as New Zealand i.e., by 
contract with a race of savages, the Crown of 
England obtaining the sovereignty or high domain 
and confirming and guaranteeing to the Aborigines 
the useful domain or the use and possession of all 
16 
the lands" 
l.b..id, 243 
11 
II. HISTORICALLY CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT THE TREATY HAS 
TO BE INCORPORATED INTO MUNICIPAL LAW TO BE EFFECTIVE. 
Subject to the qualification already referred to, that there 
are diverging lines of authority, it has generally been 
accepted that the Courts considered the Treaty was a legally 
binding document in the decades following the signing of the 
Treaty but that following Wi Parata (supra) and the passing of 
Acts such as the Land Title Protection Act 1902 and the Native 
Land Act 1909 it was considered that the Treaty was not a 
17 
source of law. 
Apart from the kauwaeranga (supra) judgment authority up to and 
including Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land 
Board (1941) NZLR 590 provides that the Treaty will not be of 
effect unless it is incorporated into municipal law. Cases in 
addition to Wi Parata (supra) which support the view that the 
Treaty must be incorporated include Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
(1900) AC 561 (Privy Council), Waipapakura v Hempton (1914) 33 
NZLR 1065 (Full Supreme Court Wellington, Stout CJ, Edwards J 
and Cooper J) and Te Heuheu (supra). 
The matter that arose for consideration in Nireaha (supra) was 
whether the appellant had a native title of occupancy to the 
land at issue. 
The Privy Council considered that the appellant's claim could 
be considered because the Lands Claim Ordinance 1841 declared 
the title of the Crown subject to the "rightful and necessary 
occupation and use ''of the Maori inhabitants and sections 3,4 
and 5 of the Native Rights Act 1865 gave the Civil Courts 
jurisdiction to ascertain native title to and interest in 
according to custom or usage of the Maori people. 
Royal Commission Volume III part 1 page 96; The Treaty of 
Waitangi and Maori Fisheries, Law Commission, March 1989 pp 
106-129. 
12 
The Privy council made it clear however that the Treaty itself 
did not create the rights of the Maori occupiers but rather 
those rights only arose because there was a specific statutory 
provision in municipal law creating that right. The Privy 
Council considered that the Lands Claim Ordinance 1841 which 
declared the title of the Crown subject to the "rightful and 
necessary occupation and use" of the Maori inhabitants: 
" ....... was to that extent a legislative 
recognition of the rights confirmed and guaranteed 
by the second article of the Treaty of Waitangi. 
It would not of itself, however, be sufficient to 
create a right in the Native occupiers cognizable 
18 
in a court of law" 
In Waipapakura (supra) the full Supreme Court was required to 
decide whether the appellants had in fact been using nets 
unlawfully in terms of specific fishing regulations or whether 
the appellants had been exercising a Maori fishing right which 
was saved from the operation of the Fisheries Act 1908 by 
Sections 76 and 77(2) of that Act which provided that: 
''76(1) No Maori or half-caste habitually living 
with Maoris according to their customs shall be 
sued for any fine or forfeiture under this part of 
this Act unless and until the authority of the 
Native Minister to take proceedings has been filed 
in the Court in which such proceedings are intended 
to be taken. 
(2) The aforesaid authority of the Native Minister 
may from time to time be signified by him to any 
person, either generally or specifically, and shall 
be valid if signified by telegraph or telephone 
message .... 
Page 567; referred to in Huakina page 206. 
13 
77 ( 1) .... 
(2) Nothing in this part of this Act shall affect 
any existing Maori fishing rights." 
The Court adopted the arguments raised by the Crown in the 
course of reaching its conclusion that the nets had in fact 
been used unlawfully. The Court considered that section 77(2) 
was a saving clause and was not the grant of a right and that 
even if the Treaty of Waitangi had granted such a right it 
could not be of any effect because the legislature had not 
confirmed that grant. Following Wi Parata (supra) and Nireaha 
(supra) Stout CJ commented: 
19 
20 
" ..... It is clear from the decision of the Privy 
Council in Nireaha ....... that until there is some 
legislative proviso to the carrying-out of the 
Treaty, the Court is helpless to give effect to its 
19 
provisions .... " 
" .... It may be, to put the case the strongest 
possible way for the Maoris, that the Treaty of 
Waitangi meant to give such an exclusive right to 
the Maoris, but if it meant to do so no legislation 
has been passed conferring the right and in absence 
of such both Wi Parata and Nireaha are authorities 
for saying that until given by statute no such 
20 
right can be enforced .... " 
(1914) 33 NZLR 1065, pp 1070-1071. 
Ibid, pp 1071-1072. 
14 
The proceedings in Te Heuheu (supra) were instituted by the 
appellant to remove the statutory charge imposed upon the 
native owners by section 14 of the Native Purposes Act 1935 
which provided that: 
"14(1) The Aotea District Maori Land Board( .... ) 
is hereby authorised, empowered and directed to 
accept the offer of the Egmont Box Co Ltd, to 
release and discharge the Board and the Native 
Owners from all claims and demands of whatever kind 
arising out of a certain agreement made between the 
Tongariro Timber Co Ltd, and the said Egmont Box Co 
Ltd, dated .... in consideration of a sum approved 
by the Native Minister to be paid to the said 
Egmont Box Co Ltd, by the Board. 
2(a) The sum approved by the Native Minister, 
together with all costs and expenses incurred by 
the Board in connection with its negotiations by 
the Board out of moneys in its account .... shall be 
deemed to be a loan to the owners, including the 
Crown .... 
(b) upon payment of such sum as aforesaia the Board 
shall .... be deemed to have a charge upon all the 
lands and the revenue thereof referred to in 
paragraph (a) .... " 
The contention made by the appellant, which is relevant to the 
matter at issue, was that section 14 of the Native Purposes Act 
1935 was ultra vires the legislature of New Zealand in so far 
as it derogated from the rights conferred on native owners by 
the Treaty of Waitangi. 
15 
The appellants' arguments in support of this contention were as 
follows: 
"(i) .... the Treaty of Waitangi was a solemn compact 
defying the rights given to the Maori people in 
respect of their lands; 
(ii) .... the right thus acquired by the Maori people 
is cognisable in the Courts. 
(iii) .... such right was declared by the Imperial Act, 
the New Zealand Constitution Act, 1852 (15-16 
Viet; C.72) which granted a representative 
constitution to New Zealand. 
(iv) .... the Colonial Laws validity Act, 1865 (28-29 
Viet; C.63), preserves such right; 
(v) the New Zealand Constitution Amendment Act, 
1857 (20-21 Viet; C.53) which amended the above 
Act of 1852, did not authorise the Parliament of 
New Zealand to legislate in derogation of a 
treaty right; and 
(vi) that the legislature of New Zealand has 
recognised and adopted the Treaty as part of the 
municipal law, and that S.14 of the Native 
Purposes Act, 1935, derogates from the right 
conferred by the Second Article of the Treaty in 
so much as it imposes a charge on the Native 
21 
lands." 
(1941) NZLR 590, 596. 
16 
In concluding that section 14 of the Native Purposes Act 1935 
was not ultra vires the Privy Council, interalia, adopted the 
general principles of Vajesingji Jora Varasingji v Secretary of 
State for India (supra) and concluded as a matter of fact that 
the Treaty was not incorporated into municipal law. While the 
Court acknowledged that the right conferred by the Treaty of 
Waitangi was made a substantive part of the municipal law by 
section 73 of the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 this 
situation had been altered by the legitimate enactment a few 
months later of a provision in the same terms as section 14 of 
the New Zealand Act 1935 (The Native Purposes Act 1935) which 
effectively overrode the earlier provision. 
17 
III. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT THE 
TREATY MUST BE INCORPORATED INTO MUNICIPAL LAW STILL 
APPLIES: THE PROSPECTS OF CHANGE FROM THAT VIEW. 
There is no doubt, following recent decisions including~ 
Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General (1987) lNZLR 641 that 
the courts still maintain that the law requires the Treaty to 
be incorporated into municipal law for it to be judiciable. 
There has been some ''liberalisation" of the 
principle/acknowledgrnent of exceptions to it which, coupled 
with a re-analysis of past decisions, consideration of the 
relevance of the principle to the New Zealand situation, 
changed social and political circumstances and perceptions of 
the Treaty, could result in an argument that the Treaty does 
not need to be incorporated being successful however. 
A. Principle that the Treaty must be incorporated into 
municipal law still applies. 
The decisions of Inspector of Fisheries v Ihaia Weepu 
and another [1958] NZLR 920, Re The Bed of the Wanganui River 
[1962] NZLR 600, Keepa v Inspector of Fisheries [1965] NZLR 
322, New Zealand Maori Council (supra) and Love and Ors v 
Attorney General and Ors (Unreported decision of the High 
Court, Wellington Registry 17 March 1988) reflect the view that 
the law requires the Treaty to be incorporated into municipal 
law for it to be justiciable. 
The matter at issue in Weepu (supra), like the earlier case of 
Waipapakura (supra) concerned section 77(2) of the Fisheries 
Act 1908 and whether or not the defendants possessed an 
existing Maori fishing right within the meaning of section 
77(2). In reaching his conclusion that the Defendants did not 
possess an existing Maori fishing right within the meaning of 
the provision Adams J commented that: 
18 
"It is trite law that the Treaty of Waitangi 
confers no rights cognizable in a court of law: 
Waipapakura .... Hoani .... 
For some purposes the Courts may take cognizance of 
rights preserved by the Treaty (Nireaha .... ) but, 
in the absence of statutory provision, a legal 
claim against the Crown cannot be founded on the 
22 
Treaty." 
Similarly in Keepa (supra), which also concerned the 
application of section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908, Hardie 
Boys J implicitly accepted that the Treaty had to be 
23 
incorporated into a statute to be of effect. 
In Re the Bed Of the Wanganui River (supra) Turner J observed 
that: 
"the obligation of the Crown under the Treaty 
was akin to a Treaty obligation and was not a right 
enforceable at the suit of any private persons as a 
matter of municipal law by virtue of the Treaty ... 
24 
itself". 
[1958] NZLR 920, 925. 
23 (1965] NZLR 322, see for example page 327. The finding of 
the Court in that case, from the headnote, was that "Customary 
Maori fishing rights on the foreshore between high and low 
water marks or a particular place are extinguished (if they 
ever existed) when title is granted or a freehold order is made 
in respect of the land bordering the sea at that place. 
Thereafter the Maori has no greater fishing rights than his 
pakeha neighbour and section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908 
does not protect a Maori charged with a breach of that Act or 
of Regulations made thereunder which has been committed by him 
between high and low water marks at that place." 
24 [1962] NZLR 600, 623. 
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As indicated in RP Beast's article "New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney General : Case of the Century? the "case is, if 
anything, an illustration of the rule" " ..... that rights 
conferred by the Treaty are unenforceable unless incorporated 
25 
into a statute." 
[The background to the New Zealand Maori Council case was that 
the State Owned Enterprises Bill was amended to include 
sections 9 and 27 of the Act to alleviate fears that the 
transfer of land to the Corporations would mean the Crown could 
not return it to Maori if recommended to do so by the Waitangi 
Tribunal. (Section 9 of the Act provided that nothing in the 
Act should permit the Crown to act in a manner inconsistent 
with the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi and section 27 
dealt with land which was subject to a claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal under the Waitangi Act 1975 on or before 18 December 
1986) The New Zealand Maori Council applied under Part I of 
the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 for a review of the proposed 
exercise of the statutory power to transfer all or any 
Crownland to a State Owned Enterprise. Interalia the Court of 
Appeal held that section 9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 
was a firm declaration that nothing in the Act would permit the 
Crown to act inconsistently with the principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi and overrode the rest of the Act]. 
Excerpts from the judgments which specifically endorse the 
principle that the Treaty must be incorporated to be of effect 
26 
are as follows: 
Cooke Pat page 655: 
"Counsel for the applicants did not go so far as to 
contend that, apart altogether from the SOE Act, 
the Treaty ... is a Bill of Rights or fundamental 
[1987] NZLJ 392. 
26 Aspects of Cooke P's and Somers J's judgements which 
indicate that the principle is not a strict one are discussed 
below. 
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NZ constitutional document in the sense that it 
could override Acts of our legislature. Counsel 
could hardly have done so in the face of the 
decision of the Privy Council in Hoani ..... That 
rights conferred by the Treaty cannot be enforced 
in the courts except in so far as statutory 
recognition of the rights can be found .... " 
and further at page 668: 
"In short the present decision together with the 
two Acts means that there will now be an effective 
legal remedy by which grievous wrongs suffered by 
one of the Treaty partners in breach of the 
principles of the Treaty can be righted. I have 
called this a success for the Maoris, but let what 
opened the way enabling the Court to reach this 
decision not be overlooked. Two crucial steps were 
taken by parliament in enacting the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act and in insisting on the principles of 
the Treaty in the State Owned Enterprises Act. If 
the judiciary has been able to play a role to some 
extent creative, that is because the legislature 
has given the opportunity." 
Somers J at page 691: 
"The received view of the law is that the Treaty 
does not form a part of municipal law of New 
Zealand as administered by its courts except to the 
21 
extent it is made so by statute. This proposition 
is referred to by the Privy Council in Hoani .... , 
where Viscount Simon LC delivering the judgment of 
the Board said: 
... To the same effect is the statement by Turner J 
in Re the Bed of the Wanganui River .... when he 
observed that the obligation of the Crown under the 
Treaty of Waitangi "was akin to a treaty obligation 
and was not a right enforceable at the suit of any 
private persons as a matter of municipal law by 
virtue of the Treaty itself:. 
Notwithstanding some criticisms of these opinions, 
I am of the opinion that they correctly set out the 
law. Neither the provisions of the Treaty .... nor 
its principles are, as a matter of law, a restraint 
on the legislative supremacy of parliament." 
The case of Love and Ors (supra) concerned an interlocutory 
application to strike out judicial review proceedings on the 
grounds that the pleadings did not disclose a reasonable cause 
of action. 
The cause of action relied on by the plaintiff was that the 
proposed sale of shares in Petrocorp (announced in the 
Government's June 1987 Budget) involved the exercise of a 
"Statutory power of decision "as defined in section 3 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972". (There were two statutory 
powers involved, section 15 of the Ministry of Energy Act 1977 
and section 2 of the Finance Act 1982, both of which did not 
contain any directions as to the factors to be considered by 
Ministers when deciding when and how to dispose of the shares). 
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The essence of the applicant's claim was that Taranaki Maori 
had a claim before the Waitangi Tribunal relating to Tribal 
lands encompassing all lands commonly known as the Taranaki 
Region and including part of Wellington, and the North of the 
South Island including the Chathams, and they were likely to 
get a recommendation from the Waitangi Tribunal that 
substantial relief be granted by way of transfer of land, money 
by way of compensation. They maintained that they were likely 
to get recognition from the Tribunal that the rights include 
rights to petroleum gas and other minerals beneath the surface 
and that the decision to sell the shares would result in the 
shares themselves and access to Petrocorp's assets being 
removed as a possible form of compensation. 
In the course of reaching his conclusion that the action should 
be struck out Ellis J referred to Cooke P's and Somers J's 
comments about Te Heuheu (supra) in the New Zealand Maori 
Council (supra) case, and implicitly accepted them as being 
correct but concluded that the Love case was in sharp contrast 
to the New Zealand Maori Council case which had section 9 and 
that the court was not empowered to give effect to the Treaty 
provisions when considering the lawfulness or otherwise of the 
sale of Petrocorp shares. 
B. There has been a ''liberalisation" of the principle and an 
acknowledgement of exceptions to it. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy referred to four ways in 
which the Treaty can, and has been relied on, even though it is 
not in legislation: 
"1. interpret legislation so that it does not breach 
the Treaty (Huakina) 
2. give content to general language in legislation by 
reference to the Treaty (Te Weehi) 
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3. use the Treaty as evidence or declaratory of the 
existing customary position (even Wi Parata 
acknowledges that possibility) 
4. in an extreme case use the Treaty as a basic limit 
27 
on legislative power (Keith, 1988 = 2)" 
(i) Interpret legislation so that it does not breach the 
Treaty: The Treaty as an aid to statutory interpretation. 
In New Zealand Maori Council (supra) Cooke P accepted a 
submission from Counsel for the applicants to the effect that 
the Treaty should be used as an aid to statutory 
interpretation: 
" The Treaty is a document relating to 
fundamental rights; that it should be interpreted 
widely and effectively and as a living instrument 
taking account of subsequent developments of 
international human rights norms and that the court 
will not ascribe to Parliament an intention to 
permit conduct inconsistent with the principles of 
the Treaty. I accept that this is the correct 
approach when interpreting ambiguous legislation or 
working out the importance of an express reference 
28 
to the principles of the Treaty ..... " 
In adopting such an approach Cooke P was reinforcing the 
approach taken by Chilwell Jin Huakina v Waikato Valley 
Authority [1987] 2 NZLR 188. In view of the importance of this 
decision in anticipating how the Treaty may be used as an aid 
to statutory interpretation in the future, and Chilwell J's 
detailed reasoning on this matter, it is necessary to consider 
it in some detail. 
Volume III part 1 page 98. 
28 page 656; see also RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council" 
[1987] NZLJ 240. 
24 
The facts of Huakina (supra), in brief, were that the owners of 
a dairy property applied to the Waikato Valley Authority for a 
water right pursuant to section 21 of the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 for a grant to discharge treated dairy 
shed water and waste, and the right was granted. The Huakina 
Development Trust, the sole objector to the application, 
appealed to the Planning Tribunal and their appeal was 
dismissed. The Trust's appeal to the High Court, the case 
before Chilwell J, was successful. 
Chilwell J's rationale for concluding that an application of 
the principles of statutory interpretation meant that Maori 
spiritual values could be taken into account in determining 
applications for water rights, although there was no reference 
in the Act to Maori values generally (as may be found in S.3 
(17)(g) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977) let a~~ne to 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi was as follows: 
Chilwell J posed a rhetorical question at page 219 of the 
decision to the effect that given the relationship of the Water 
Act and Town and Country Planning Act, and the other 
circumstances of the case were Maori cultural and spiritual 
values a relevant consideration to be taken into account under 
the Act? 
The answer to the rhetorical question was given at page 223 in 
the following terms: 
" .... Maori spiritual and cultural values .... cannot be 
excluded from consideration .... for the reason that the 
Water Act is so deficient in guidelines that the Court has 
to resort to extrinsic aids. In this case those aids 
include the Treaty of Waitangi, the Treaty of Waitangi Act, 
Waitangi Tribunal interpretations of the Treaty and the 
Planning Act. Through all those agencies a common theme is 
found. 
See also RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council "[1987] NZLJ 
248 II 
The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 Page 20 (Durie) and pp 42-43 (Kenderdine). 
25 
As the criteria to be applied in an application for 
a water right under section 21 of the Act are 
unspecified, and the grounds upon which a person 
may lodge an objection under section 24(4) are 
indefinite, the Court has to resort to extrinsic 
aids. 
it is arguable that the Town and Country Planning 
Act 1977, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
and the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 
1941 constitute a comprehensive statutory scheme 
and consequently the express terms of one of those 
statutes can provide a useful analogy for the 
interpretation of another statute to ensure that 
30 
the statutes are consistent. 
the Planning Act gives recognition to Maori 
concerns specifically and generally and 
consequently these provisions may provide a useful 
analogy for the interpretation of another statute 
in order to ensure that the two statutes are 
consistent: 
- case law establishes that customs and practices 
which include spiritual elements are cognisable 
in a Court of law provided they are properly 
established by evidence. 
- case law establishes that international 
instruments, whether they be convention 
covenants, declarations or treaties, may be 
used as aids in the interpretation of statutes. 
There is specific case law supporting the view that the 
Planning Act and the Water Act must operate in conjunction as 
they are complementary. Even if they are not related there is 
authority for the view that a statute may be invoked by an act 
in interpreting the scope of another statute or common law rule 
even though the statute in question is not directly related. 
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While recent cases indicate that the principle of using the 
Treaty as an aid to interpreting legislation so that it does 
not breach the Treaty is acknowledged it has not been used to 
its fullest effect. In Love v Attorney General (supra) Ellis J 
referred to Cooke P's comments about the Treaty providing an 
aid to statutory interpretation but did not refer to Huakina 
(supra) and did not consider the circumstances were such to 
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warrant relief on that basis. It is arguable, however, that 
analogies could have been drawn between Huakina (supra) and the 
Love (supra) situation, and reliance placed on Cooke P's 
comments in the New Zealand Maori Council case, to have 
required the Treaty to be used as an aid to statutory 
interpretation. 
In~ (supra), as in Huakina (supra), the criteria to be 
applied in respect of the relevant legislation were not 
specified. Section 15 of the Ministry of Energy Act 1977 and 
section 2 of the Finance Act 1982 did not refer to any criteria 
which the Minister had to have regard to in exercising his 
statutory power of decision to sell the shares. 
Similarly, while Chilwell J placed some emphasis in Huakina 
(supra) on the fact that the Town and Country Planning Act 1976 
(which was part of a statutory scheme with the Water Act and 
the River Control Act) recognised Maori concerns, and there was 
authority for the view that the express terms of one of those 
statutes could provide an analogy for the interpretation of 
another related statute, he also acknowledged that a statute 
could be used by a Court in interpreting the scope of another 
statute even when they are not related: 
See also reference to Cooke P's statements in New Zealand 
Maori Council in MAF v Hakaria and Scott (unreported decision 
Levin District Court 19 May 1989; Royal Commission Volume III 
Part 1 page 92 where reference is made to FM Brookfield's 
memorial lecture and his statement that in the past there was 
no basis for recognising the Treaty but a modern view might 
allow it a role in assisting with the interpretation of 
legislation. 
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"A statute may be involved by a Court in 
interpreting the scope of another statute or a 
common law rule even though the statute in question 
is not directly related .... 
In the Fletcher Timber case, concerning the extent 
of public interest immunity, the Court of Appeal 
refused to follow a decision of the House of Lords. 
One of the grounds was the contemporary movement 
towards open Government in New Zealand. 
"This has found statutory expression in the 
Official Information Act 1982 which states as the 
first of the purposes expressed in its long title 
that it is an Act to make information more freely 
available" (1984] 1 NZLR 290, 296 per Woodhouse 
p) • 
Similarly in R v Uljee, in a case concerning 
client/solicitor privilege, the Court of Appeal 
noted that Parliament had expressly provided for 
absolute privilege in some regards under the Inland 
Revenue Department Act 1974 and the Misuse of Drugs 
Amendment Act 1978. The rule reflected "important 
public purposes" .... recognised by statute and 
indicated a general public policy" 
The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 provides for the 
observance and confirmation of the Treaty's 
principles by establishing the Waitangi Tribunal to 
inquire into and make recommendations upon any 
claim by a Maori that he, or a group of Maoris of 
which he is a member, is likely to be "prejudially 
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affected· .... This statutory recognition of the 
Treaty, as part of the fabric of New Zealand 
society, is further enhanced by the preamble and 
the definition of the word "Treaty" which means the 
Treaty of Waitangi as set out in the English and in 
Maori in the first schedule .... "(pp 212-213) 
It is anticipated that more "ardent" attempts will be made in 
the future to rely on Chilwell J's comments in Huakina, (supra) 
which were reinforced by the Court of Appeal in the New Zealand 
Maori Council case, that the Treaty can and should be used as 
an aid to statutory interpretation. If this occurs more 
significant developments (so far as the strengthening of the 
role of the Treaty is concerned) than occurred in the~ case 
seem a likely result. 
(ii) Give Content to general language in legislation by 
reference to the Treaty. 
In Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer (1986] INZLR 680 
earlier cases concerning the equivalent to section 88(2) were 
distinguished (Waipapakura y Hempton (1914) 33NZLR 1065; 
Inspector of Fisheries v Ihaia Weepu and Others (1956] NZLR 
920; Keepa and Wiki v Inspector of Fisheries (1965] NZLR 322) 
on the grounds that Te Weehi's claim was not based on a 
question of land ownership, and that he was not seeking an 
exclusive right. The Court concluded that as a result of the 
general provision in section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983, 
which provided that "Nothing in this Act shall affect any Maori 
Fishing rights", Maori fishing rights exercised in a customary 
way are exempt from regulations under the Fisheries Act, and 
that customary fishing rights continued. 
This was a significant departure from the Waipapakura (supra) 
case but consistent with the approach taken by the Courts in 
Weepu (supra) and Keepa (supra) on this point given that in 
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both cases it was considered that Maori fishing rights included 
customary fishing rights which were preserved by the Treaty of 
32 
Waitangi and were still unextinguished. In Waipapakura 
(supra) section 77(2) of the Fisheries Act 1908, which provided 
that "nothing in this part of this Act shall affect any 
existing Maori fishing rights" was described as a savings 
clause "which did not grant any right and in effect restricted 
the words "Maori fishing rights" to a consideration of Maori 
fishing rights conferred by statute only. In that case it was 
held that customary fishing rights were not preserved in law by 
the Treaty of Waitangi and could only exist if they had been 
conferred by legislation. 
Te Weehi (supra) was followed in the interim decision of N.ggi 
Tahu Maori Trust Board v Attorney General and Another 
(unreported CP 559/87, High Court of Wellington 2 November 
1987), where Grieg J concluded that section 88(2) of the 
Fisheries Act meant that nothing could be done under that Act 
which would affect, restrict, limit or extinguish Maori fishing 
rights that existed in 1840. Similarly, Inglis J followed T.e. 
Weehi (supra) in the recent District Court decision of MAF y 
Hakaria and Scott (unreported decision Levin District Court 19 
May 1989), although some gloss was placed on that decision in 
so far as Inglis J considered that the New Zealand Maori 
Council case enabled the Court "to take a step beyond Te 
33 
Weehi's case in understanding the effect of section 88(2)" 
and Inglis sought to define customary Maori fishing rights in 
the following way: 
33 
"A customary or traditional Maori fishing right 
cannot be seen in isolation from the protocol and 
other customary requirements in exercising it. The 
right and its exercise must be seen from a Maori 
perspective so much is I think implicit in the 
[1986] lNZLR 680, 689. 
page 2. 
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Court of Appeal's decision in the New Zealand Maori 
Council case. The question is whether the 
defendants exercised their undoubted rights in a 
manner that was appropriate and acceptable in 
custom and tradition". 
" .... I pointed out that this was not a case of 
harvesting toheroa for sale in the pub, as 
sometimes happens, which would plainly be an 
offence against strong traditional Maori values 
.... taking toheroa for sale in hotels cannot 
possibly be regarded as exercising a traditional or 
customary Maori fishing right and cannot be 
protected by section 88(2). Neither the Treaty nor 
section 88(2) gives any Maori person the right to 
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abuse custom, tradition or protocol." 
(iii) The Treaty as evidence or declaratory of the existing 
customary position 
While it is generally accepted that the application of the 
doctrine of aboriginal title means that Maori have customary 
rights irrespective of the Treaty Somers Jin New Zealand Maori 
Council(supra) referred to a number of cases dealing with 
customary rights and commented that the courts were obliged to 
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have regard to the Treaty in these circumstances. In the 
New Zealand Maori Council case Somers J confirmed that the 
principle of Te Heuheu (supra) still applied and was relevant 
to the case but suggested that there were circumstances where 
the Treaty would not need to be incorporated in order for it to 
be given effect and referred to cases which supported this 
view: 
page 7; the decision is being appealed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 
35 see for example Waitangi Tribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report 
page 209 discussion which indicates Maori have customary rights 
irrespective of the Treaty. 
36 
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"This is not to suggest that the courts have ever 
supposed that the Crown was not under an obligation 
to have regard to the Treaty although that duty was 
not justiciable in this country, at least when the 
dispute was not with the Crown in respect of its 
prerogative or Royal rights. In Re Lundon and 
Whitaker Claims (1872) 2NZCA 41 Arney CJ, 
delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal 
said, at page 49, "The Crown is bound, both by the 
common law of England and by its own solemn 
engagements, to a full recognition of Native 
Proprietary right". In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker 
(1984) 12 NZLR 483 (not affected on this point by 
the appeal reported at [1901] AC 561) Richmond J 
for the Court of Appeal said at page 488 "The 
Crown is under a solemn engagement to observe 
strict justice in the matter, but of necessity it 
must be left to the conscience of the Crown to 
36 
determine what is justice." in Baldick v Jackson 
(1910) 30NZLR 345 .... Stout CJ observed of a 
claim that a whale was a Royal fish under a statute 
of Edward II that it "would have been impossible to 
claim without claiming it against the Maoris, for 
they are accustomed to engage in whaling; and the 
Treaty of Waitangi assumed that their fishing was 
not to be interfered with ... In the instant case 
Prior to making this statement Richmond J said at page 488: 
"There can be no known rule of law by which the 
validity of dealings .... of the sovereign with the 
Native tribes .... for the extinction of their 
territorial rights can be tested". 
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however, no difficulty of the kind mentioned in Te. 
Heuheu Tukino's case arises. Municipal law, that 
is to say S9 of the State Owned Enterprises Act 
1986 recognises the Treaty of Waitangi by expressly 
limiting the Crown's power to act under the 1986 
Act by reference to the Treaty principles. The 
difference that does arise because that section 9 
does not refer to acts of the Crown inconsistent 
with the Treaty, but to acts inconsistent with its 
37 
principles". 
Although the Court of Appeal was not required to decisively 
determine the effects of the doctrine of aboriginal title in 
the New Zealand Maori Council case Somers J has undoubtedly 
paved the way for an application of the doctrine in the future 
and as indicated in the following comments by the Law 
Commission the doctrine has already gained significant 
acceptance: 
" This is the concept of aboriginal title. In 
respect of the land where Maori customary title has 
been ascertained and extinguished the common law 
has admittedly been superseded by statute. But in 
other cases it remains applicable except that, 
because of sections 153-157 of the Maori Affairs 
3'7 pages 691-692; See also Cooke Pat pp 667-668. He was 
also concerned that no injustice be done by the rigid 
application of the Te Heuheu principle; Royal Commission Volume 
III Part 1 page 91 reference was made to the fact that the 
Courts could not recognise the force of the Treaty in earlier 
cases because there was no legislation but they "recognised its 
moral force and the Crown's responsibility" - comments in N.slli 
Zealand Maori Council were quoted. 
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Act 1953, it cannot be invoked against the Crown in 
respect of land. In other words Maori property 
rights continued to exist unless and until 
legislation took them away. 
If the last of these propositions is valid the law 
already recognises to an uncertain degree Maori 
rights in respect of traditional fisheries. It 
cannot be affirmed that the New Zealand Courts have 
adopted it. However, some very recent decisions 
have gone some way towards accepting the concept 
that indigenous people had property rights at 
38 
Common law. " 
In addition to the recent endorsements of the doctrine of 
aboriginal title in Court decisions and Waitangi Tribunal 
cases, the prolific writings of PG McHugh (which appear to have 
gained widespread acceptance) and international developments 
suggest that the doctrine will be ~~enly adopted by the New 
Zealand Courts in the near future. The doctrine will 
Law Commission Report on Maori fisheries, pages 56-57. 
39 Explicit Authority of Te Weehi (supra) Ngai Tahu, Maori 
Trust Board (supra) and MAF Y Hakaria (supra). 
Implicit Authority Higgins y Bird (7 Waiariki ACMB 24 see for 
example for acceptance and international developments Law 
Commission Report on Maori Fisheries, pages "A Bill of Rights 
for New Zealand", Legal Research Foundation Seminar, University 
of Auckland, August 1985, "Part II and clause 26 of the Draft 
New Zealand Bill of Rights" Chief Judge ETJ Durie at page 175; 
PG McHugh "Aboriginal Title in New Zealand Courts" (1984] 
Canterbury Law Review page 235; PG McHugh "The Legal Status of 
Maori Fishing Rights in Tidal Waters" (1984] VUWLR, 247; PG 
McHugh "Aboriginal Title Returns to the New Zealand Courts" 
(1987] NZLJ, 39; Treasury Paper, Government Management Volume 1 
Chapter 5 "Implications of the Treaty of Waitangi" page 322. 
See also the decision of RV Symonds (1847) (1840- 1932) NZPCC 
387, 390 for early acceptance of the doctrine and reference to 
the decision in the Law Commission Reports on Fisheries at 
pages 114 to 115; Comments on RV Symonds in Te Weehi (supra) 
page 687. 
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undoubtedly gain an even greater position if sections 153 to 
157 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953 are repealed as proposed in 
40 
the Bill currently before parliament. 
Law Commission Report on Fisheries pages 56 to 57: 
''In respect of land where Maori customary title has 
been ascertained and extinguished the Common law has 
admittedly been superseded by statute. But in other 
cases it remains applicable except that, because of 
sections 153-157 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953, it 
cannot be invoked against the Crown in respect of land. 
In other words Maori property rights continued to exist 
unless and until legislation took them away". 
(emphasis added) 
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c. There are prospects for change from the principle that the 
Treaty must be incorporated 
In view of the factors discussed above which indicate a 
departure from a strict interpretation of the principle I 
consider that in an appropriate case a court may find that ,Te 
Heuheu (supra) is no longer relevant/sustainable. Factors 
arguably in support of such a view would include the following: 
(i) the Court of Appeal in the New Zealand Maori Council 
(supra) case was considering a situation where the 
Treaty was specifically incorporated and therefore T.e. 
Heuheu (supra) did not have to come into strong 
questioning. Somers J acknowledged that there were 
circumstances where the Crown was under an obligation 
to have regard to the Treaty although it was not 
incorporated and Cooke P indicated that he considered 
an injustice could be done by the rigid application of 
the Te Heuheu principle. It seems that the judges 
would not uphold the ~finciple in a future case if an 
injustice was likely. 
The notion of the Courts being obliged as a matter of 
fairness to have regard to the Treaty was taken a step 
further in the recent District Court decision of MAF y 
Hakaria and Scott (supra). In that case Inglis J went 
as far as suggesting that it was now inappropriate to 
follow Te Heuheu (supra): 
ttit is possible that cases such as Waipapakura .... 
Keepa ... reflected the mood of earlier times, as did 
the decision of the Privy Council in Te Heuheu ..... 
In instances where Parliament has either shut the door 
against Treaty rights or has at least not opened it 
..... there may be some chafing against the fetters of 
pages 691-692 
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the past precedent, evolved when the partnership was 
42 
seen differently by many .... " 
(ii) it has already been argued by one commentator (A Frame 
(1984) 14 VUWLR 228) that a review coupling the 
Kauwaeranga judgment (supra) and Nireaha Tamaki 
(supra), which was critical of Prendergast CJ's 
approach in Wi Parata (supra), decisions may be able to 
"put an end to the Wi Parata dead end" which in turn 
influenced the decision in Te Heuheu (supra). This 
view is consistent with that of Inglis Jin MAF y 
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Hakaria and Scott (supra) 
(iii) as discussed previously the courts have been prepared 
to use the Treaty as an aid to statutory interpretation 
where language in legislation is general and in the 
case of Huakina (supra) to infer a reference to the 
Treaty when there was no reference to the Treaty or 
Maori values generally. 
(iv) the principle referred to in Te Heuheu (supra) is no 
longer sustainable given the developments which have 
occurred in the area of human rights generally and 
indigenous peoples customary rights specifically. It 
would seem to be inconsistent with those developments 
to continue to accept a principle which in effect 
states that the fact that an agreement between the 
Crown and the indigenous people/subsumed people is not 
subsequently honoured by the agreement being 
incorporated into municipal law is of no legal 
relevance. Indications that the principle is no longer 
page 3 
43 This view would also seem to be consistent with that of 
Sir Kenneth Keith's referred to in Royal Commission Volume III 
Part 1 page 98 i.e., "in an extreme case use the Treaty as a 
basic limit on legislative power. (Keith) 1988:21 FM 
Brookfield" The New Zealand Constitution "in "Waitangi, Maori 
and Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi" (edited by 
IH Kawharu) page 10 does not agree with this view. 
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acceptable are seen from the following: 
Cooke Pin New Zealand Maori Council was 
prepared to accept that the Treaty "should 
be interpreted widely and effectively and as 
a living instrument taking account of the 
subsequent developments of international 
44 
human rights norms." 
there is an international view that 
"indigenous minorities are entitled to 
rights exceeding those of non indigenous 
45 
cultural minorities." 
the doctrine of aboriginal title has gained 
renewed preeminence. 
Changed social and political circumstances 
have made the Treaty a part of New 
Zealand's social fabric. As discussed by 
Chilwell Jin Huakina (supra) one of the 
grounds for the Court of Appeal refusing to 
follow a House of Lords decision in 
Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney General 
(1984] lNZLR 290 (concerning the extent of 
public interest immunity) was that there 
was a contemporary movement towards open 
46 
Government in New Zealand. 
page 656 
45 "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand", Legal Research 
Foundation Seminar, University of Auckland, August 1985, "Part 
II and Clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights'' Chief 
Judge ETJ Durie at page 175. 
As discussed in Huakina (supra), at page 215, international 
instruments, whether they are conventions, covenants, 
declarations or treaties may be used as aids to statutory 
interpretation. 
46 page 215 
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(v) the principle of partnership was adopted by the 
Court of Appeal in the New Zealand Maori Council 
case, as being the preeminent Treaty principle. A 
consequence of adopting such a principle means that 
the Treaty must be seen as a contract and 
consequently the principles applying to 
partnersh¼~s, as opposed to Treaties generally, are 
relevant. RP Boast explained the development in 
the following way in a recent article: 
"The Court of Appeal may have been quite 
deliberately characterising the Treaty 
relationship in the way it did at least not to 
foreclose subsequent development in the direction 
of developing remedies for those situations where 
the Treaty is not referred to in a statute. A 
partnership which contains no remedy for breaches 
of the obligations it entails might be thought to 
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be a rather pointless relationship .... " 
47 RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council'' [1987] NZLJ at 392. 
48 Ibid. At page 243 Boast says "A consequence (of defining 
the relationship as one of partnership] is that the 
relationships between the parties are in a sense fiduciary, as 
was submitted by counsel for the Applicants relying on the 
Canadian decisions of Guerin v The Queen (1984) 13DLR (4th) 
321, and Kruger v The Queen (1985) 17 DLR 591." 
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IV IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THE TREATY HAS TO BE INCORPORATED 
IT IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF PRESENT, AND UNDOUBTEDLY FUTURE, 
PUBLIC LAW 
Even if the principle of Te Heuheu (supra) was applied strictly 
and there was no prospect of it being further reduced in 
importance it appears that the Treaty would still retain a 
relatively strong position in New Zealand's Public Law given 
that it is already referred to in a number of statutes, (via 
reference to its principles or Maori values) has been the 
subject of ongoing Waitangi Tribunal and Court cases, and is 
well on the way to being entrenched as being of fundamental 
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constitutional importance in the administrative psyche (It 
is of course acknowledged that administrative commitment 
without political will is not sufficient protection but it 
should still be regarded as being a significant development). 
A. References to the Treaty in statutes 
Statutes can be categorised according to whether they make 
direct reference to the principles as a whole, to the 
principles in part or refer to Maori values generally. 
(i) Statutes referring to the principles of the Treaty 
generally 
Statutes referring to the principles of the Treaty 
include the following: 
- The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (long title and 
recitals): 
49 While it is arguable that it is not the Treaty but rather 
its principles that are invoked it has generally been accepted 
that the two are synonymous e.g., The Treaty of Waitangi, New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar, April 1989 page 21 (Durie) " .. it 
is not necessary for any Act to recite the Treaty in order to 
promote its objects. It may be sufficient for an Act to simply 
provide for Maori views." 
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"An Act to provide for the observance, and 
confirmation, of the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi by establishing a 
Tribunal to make recommendations on claims 
relating to the practical application of the 
Treaty and to determine whether certain 
matters are inconsistent with the principles 
of the Treaty" 
"Whereas on the 6th day of February 1840 a 
Treaty was entered into at Waitangi between 
her late Majesty Queen Victoria and the 
Maori people of New Zealand. And whereas 
the text of the Treaty in the English 
language differs from the text of the Treaty 
in the Maori language: And whereas it is 
desirable that a Tribunal be established to 
make recommendations on claims relating to 
the practical application of the principles 
of the Treaty and, for that purpose, to 
determine its meaning and effect and whether 
certain matters are inconsistent with these 
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principles." 
- The Conservation Act 1986 , (section 4) : 
"S.4 Act to give effect to the principles of 
the Treaty of Waitangi." 
- The Environment Act 1986 (Long Title refers to 
the principles while section 17(c) refers to 
general matters): 
See also The Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises Act) 
1988 and the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 which are aimed at 
enabling assets to be sold while at the same time protecting 
claims under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975; Waitangi Day Act 
1976. 
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"An Act to -
(a) Provide for the establishment of the 
office of Parliamentary Commissioner for 
the Environment. 
(b) Provide for the establishment of the 
Ministry for the Environment. 
(c) Ensure that, in the management of 
natural and physical resources. full and 
balanced account is taken of -
(i) The intrinsic values of 
ecosystems; and 
(ii) All values which are placed by 
individuals and groups on the 
quality of the environment. 
(iii) The principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi; and 
(iv) The sustaniability of natural 
and physical resources; and 
(v) The needs of future 
generations." 
(emphasis added) 
"S.17 Matters to which regard to be given -
In the performance of the Commissioner's 
functions the Commissioner, where the 
Commissioner considers it appropriate, shall 
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have regard, in particular but not 
exclusively, to -
(a) 
( b) ••.•. 
( C) Any land, water, sites, fishing 
grounds, or physical or cultural 
resources, or interests 
associated with such the 
heritage of the and which 
contribute to their well being." 
(emphasis added) 
- The State Owned Enterprises Act 1988 (S.9, at 
issue in New Zealand Maori Council (supra)): 
"S.9 Nothing in this Act shall permit the 
Crown to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi." 
While there have not been any cases on the meaning of the 
references to the principles in the Conservation Act or the 
Environment Act to date it seems inevitable that they will 
provide fertile ground for legal argument e.g., 
While RP Boast has expressed the view that the obligations 
imposed on the Crown by the Conservation and Environment Acts 
are even stronger than in the State Owned Enterprises Act -
"whereas S9 requires the Crown not to act in a manner contrary 
to the principles of the Treaty, the obligation required by 
51 
these two statutes is to promote Treaty principles." 
51 RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council" [1987) NZLJ at 243. 
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- S Kenderdine considers that the references are of less force 
than the references to the principles in section 9 of the State 
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Owned Enterprises Act. 
(ii) Statutes and Bills referring to the "principles of the 
Treaty" or "the Treaty" in part 
The Maori Language Act 1987 refers to the Treaty in its 
recitals as follows: 
"An Act to declare the Maori language to be an 
official language of New Zealand, to confer the 
right to speak Maori in certain legal proceedings, 
and to establish Te Komihana Mo Te Reo Maori and 
define its functions and powers. Whereas in the 
Treaty of Waitangi the Crown confirmed and 
guaranteed to the Maori people, among other things, 
all their taonga: And whereas the Maori language 
is one such taonga ... " 
The recital to the Maori Affairs Bill, which was referred to in 
New Zealand Maori Council by Bisson J at page 716 as giving 
some indication of the Government's view of the principles of 
the Treaty, appears to be an attempt to restrict the scope of 
the principles by defining what is meant by the Treaty: 
"Whereas the Treaty of Waitangi symbolises the 
special relationship between Maori people and the 
Crown: And whereas it is desirable that the spirit 
of the exchange of sovereignty for the protection 
of rangatiratanga embodied in the Treaty of 
Waitangi be reaffirmed: And whereas rangatiratanga 
in the context of the Act means the custody and 
care of matters significant to the cultural 
identity of Maori people of New Zealand in trust 
52 The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 page 49 (Kenderdine). 
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for future generations : And whereas, in 
particular, it is desirable to recognise the 
special relationship of Maori people to their land 
and for that reason to promote the retention of 
that land in the hands of the owners' descent 
groups, and to facilitate the occupation and 
utilisation of that land for the benefit of the 
owners' descent groups." 
The recital to the Maori Fisheries Bill 1988 states,. 
interalia, that the Act is: 
"(a) To recognise, in relation to New Zealand 
fisheries, the principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi; and 
(b) To make better provision for the 
conservation and management of New Zealand 
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fisheries 
(iii) Statutes and Bills referring to Maori values generally 
There are a number of acts, in addition to section 3(l)(g) of 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 (referred to in Huakina 
(supra)), section 88(2) of the Fisheries Act 1983 (referred to 
in Te Weehi (supra) and section 17(c) of the Environment Act 
1986 referred to above, which make general reference to Maori 
values e.g., 
Section 5(2)(a) of the Law Commission Act 1985 
requires the Law Commission to take into account Te 
ao Maori, or the Maori dimension i.e., 
"5. Functions - (1) The principal functions of the 
Commission are -
(a) 
see also paragraphs (e) and (1) of the recitals. 
( d) 
( 2 ) 
45 
In making its recommendations, 
the Commission -
(a) shall take into account Te ao 
Maori (The Maori dimension) and 
should also give consideration 
to the multicultural character 
of New Zealand society; and 
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( b) II 
Area Health Boards Amendment Act 1988 requires Area 
Health Boards to consider the aims and aspirations 
of the Maori 
Social Welfare Act 1971, now amended, requires the 
Social Welfare Commission to consult with iwi, at 
least annually, at a national hui. 
Section 56 of the State Sector Act 1988 requires 
Chief Executives of Departments to operate a 
personnel policy which, interalia, requires: 
II (a) 
(d) Recognition of -
(i) The aims and aspirations of the Maori 
people; and 
(ii) The employment requirements of the Maori 
people; and 
54 The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989, page 2l(Durie). 
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(iii) The need for greater involvement of the 
Maori people in the Public Service; and 
II 
Clauses SSA and SSB of the Education Bill 1989 
require that Maori values be taken into account in 
school charters i.e., 
"SSA. Views and concerns of Maori communities 
to be considered-(1) Before preparing a 
proposed charter for a school, or a proposed 
amendment to a school's charter, the Board 
shall take all reasonable steps to discover and 
consider the views and concerns of Maori 
communities living in the geographical area the 
school serves. 
(2) The Board of a correspondence school shall 
comply with subsection (1) of this section by 
consulting the Minister of Maori Affairs. 
SSB. Charters deemed to contain certain 
aims-Every charter and proposed charter is 
deemed to contain-
(a) The aim of developing for the school 
concerned policies and practices that reflect 
New Zealand's cultural diversity, and the 
unique position of Maori culture; and 
(b) The aim of taking all reasonable steps to 
ensure that instruction in tikanga Maori (Maori 
culture) and te reo Maori (the Maori language) 
are provided for full time students whose 
parents ask for it." 
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It also seems likely that the current review of Resource Use 
1 · 11 k · · 55 aws wi ma e provision for Maori interests. 
55 RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council" (1987] NZLJ at 243; 
The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, April 
1989 page 21 (Durie). Given that Mr G Palmer is Minister for 
the Environment and that he has "backtracked" on Treaty issues 
provision for Maori interests maybe more limited however; 
Dominion Newspaper article July 8 1989 "Palmer Backs off on 
Treaty Importance". 
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B. Case law arising out of references to the principles of the 
Treaty in statutes and interpretations of statutes where 
there is no specific reference. 
There has been a proliferation of case law on the Treaty which 
makes it difficult to argue that it does not already have a 
significant place in Public Law 
The significance of the Treaty principles can be seen in so far 
as: 
(i) the scope for recognising Treaty principles has 
resulted in some uncertainty which will 
inevitably result in further litigation. 
(ii) the principle of partnership is of paramount 
importance. 
(iii) reference to the "principles'', rather than the 
Treaty itself has broadened the bases for 
redress. 
(i) The scope for recognising Treaty principles has resulted in 
some uncertainty. 
The Courts and Tribunal agree that the Treaty is a living 
document and should be interpreted as such, although that needs 
to be balanced against the rule that the law should be clear, 
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accessible and accurate. However developments to date show 
a lack of clarity/uncertainty as to what constitute principles 
and consequently what will be held to constitute principles in 
the future. 
Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty 
of Waitangi, Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
November 1988 page 17 referred to in C Mander's seminar paper 
July 1989; The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar, April 1989 page 28 (Wilson) refers to Professor Orr's 
discussion of principles and conclusion that it is not possible 
to list a comprehensive set of principles. See also Royal 
Commission Volume III Part I pp 104, 227 and 233. 
49 
This uncertainty is seen in the difficulty encountered in 
summarising the principles into appropriate title categorises 
and in representing the content of these principles under each 
title. The divergences in terminology and content are seen in 
the variations between statements as to what constitute "the 
principles" for example: 
58 
- the differences between what the Maori Council 
and the Crown argued were the principles in Nfili 
Zealand Maori Council (supra), and the divergence 
between both of them and what the court finally 
determined were the relevant principles. (Copy of 
relevant summary from Environmental Management 
and the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
November 1988 at Appendix A) 
- the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment's summary of the principles as 
discerned from the Waitangi Tribunal Reports. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy and the 
Court of Appeal. (Copy at Appendix B) 
- the principles of the Treaty as expressed in the 
Muriwhenua Report. (Copy at Appendix C) 
- the principles by which the Government has 
recently said it will act. (Copy at Appendix D) 
- the principles identified by Professor Orr (Copy 
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at Appendix E) 
- the principles identified by S Kenderdine at 
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society 
58 
Seminar, April 1989 (Copy at Appendix F) 
.I.b.i.d, 28-29. 
pp 50-53. 
(ii) 
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The scope and importance of the principle of 
partnership 
As indicated by the Court of Appeal judgments in New Zealand 
Maori Council (supra), and the degree to which the word 
"partnership" has been adopted into "Treaty language" 
subsequently, the concept of partnership is probably the most 
important of all Treaty principles. 
While the "partnership" cannot be regarded as a "partnership" 
in the strict sense of the word it provides a basis for 
extending obligations of both parties in the future, although 
most notably the Crown's obligations as Trustee/Partner and may 
provide the basis for developing remedies for situations where 
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the Treaty is not referred to in statutes. While the Court 
of Appeal specifically stated that the principle of partnership 
did not create a duty to consult a duty to consult has 
subsequently been held to exist - the Responsiveness Unit of 
the State Services Commission in a booklet titled "Partnership 
Dialogue, A Maori consultation process" implies that 
consultation was adopted as a partnership principle in the 
Court of Appeal decision. (Copy of relevant extract at Appendix 
60 
G) How long will it be before consultation is seen by the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the Courts as being part of the concept 
59 RP Boast "New Zealand Maori Council" [1987] NZLJ at 243 
and 245 - emphasises partnership analogy cannot be insisted on 
too literally, it seems to resemble a "trust in the higher 
sense". 
60 Responsiveness Unit also publishes a booklet called 
"Contacts for Consultation"; consistent theme of Maori Hui is 
that partnership means sharing power and control over New 
Zealand's progress. (Royal Commission Volume III Part 1 page 
111) . 
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of partnership? How long will it be before a literal 
interpretation is given to the term partnership and as 
suggested by RP Boast remedies for breach of trust and/or 
61 
partnership are available? 
In view of the scope for the development of obligations on the 
Crown, and the limited analysis which has been applied by the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal in concluding that 
there is a "partnership" relationship there seem to be grounds 
for future court action being taken to test the basis for the 
concept and/or the justification for it extending 
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obligations. 
The nature of the concept of partnership and the limited 
analysis and basis for adopting the term are seen from the 
following extracts from the Court of Appeal judgments in Nslli 
Zealand Maori Council (supra) and Te Reo Maori and Manukau 
Waitangi Reports which the Court of Appeal judges relied on in 
reaching their conclusions: 
. Cooke Pat page 664 
"The Treaty signified a partnership between 
races, and it is in this concept that the answer 
Note though that Treasury expressed a more restrictive view 
of the concept of partnership in Treasury Paper - Government 
Management Volume 1 Chapter 5 "Implications of the Treaty of 
Waitangi" at page 326: "The point we wish to make here is that, 
in our view the principle of partnership can indeed be deduced 
from the Treaty, but its application cannot be divorced from 
the particular provisions of the Treaty and declared to be 
binding on a universal basis. The Crown is perfectly free to 
extend the concept of a special and unique partnership with the 
Maori people into areas not covered by the Treaty if it wishes 
but we do not consider that it is legally or morally bound to 
do so in terms of the Treaty". 3 principles of partnership were 
referred to at pages 323-324. 
62 There is an indication from the Royal Commission on Social 
Policy Report that Maori accepted the Treaty as a partnership 
long before the Waitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal 
"coined the phrase" e.g., Volume III Part 1 pp 103 and 111; .'l'.he. 
Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, April 1989 
page 18 (Durie) . 
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to the present case has to be found. For more 
than a century and a quarter after the Treaty, 
integration, amalgamation of the races, the 
assimilation of Maori to the Pakeha, was the goal 
which in the main successive Governments tended 
to pursue. Now the emphasis is much more on 
the need to preserve Maoritanga, Maori land and 
communal life, a distinctive Maori identity ... 
the Government, as in effect one of the Treaty 
partners, cannot fail to give weight to the 
"philosophies and urgings" currently and, it 
seems, increasingly prevailing. In the context 
the issue becomes what steps should be taken by 
the Crown, as a partner acting towards the Maori 
partner with the utmost good faith which is the 
characteristic obligation of partnership, to 
ensure that the powers in the State Owned 
Enterprises Act are not used inconsistently with 
the principles of the Treaty ... the relationship 
between the Treaty partners creates 
responsibilities analogous to fiduciary duties ... 
the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but 
extends to active protection of Maori people in 
the use of their lands and waters to the fullest 
extent practicable. the duty to act 
reasonably and in utmost good faith is not 
one-sided. For their part the Maori people have 
undertaken a duty of loyalty to the Queen, full 
acceptance of her Government through her 
responsible Ministers and reasonable 
co-operation." 
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Casey J at pages 702-703: 
"From the attitude of the Colonial Office and 
the transactions between its representatives 
and the Maori Chiefs, and from the terms of the 
Treaty itself, it is not difficult to infeT- the 
start in 1840 of something in the nature of a 
partnership between the Crown and the Maori 
people. The latter ceded rights of government 
in exchange for guarantees of possession and 
control of their lands and precious possessions 
for as long as they wanted to retain them. In 
this context Captain Robson's famous 
announcement "Now we are one people" points to 
this concept rather than to the notion that 
with a stroke of the pen both races had become 
assimilated. The Waitangi Tribunal has 
discussed those principles of the Treaty it saw 
as relevant ... this concept of an ongoing 
partnership can be detected in the Manukau 
claim ... and in the Te Atiawa claim. 
At page 61 of that decision the Treaty was 
described as "the foundation for a developing 
social contract .... " the Treaty obliges the 
Crown not only to recognize the Maori interests 
specified in it, but actively to protect them. 
I concur in thinking that this is a principle 
to be rightly drawn from a consideration of the 
Treaty provisions in the light of the 
surrounding circumstances .... 
Implicit in that relationship is the 
expectation of good faith by each side in their 
dealings with the other and in the way that the 
LAW LIBRARY 
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Crown exercises the rights of government ceded 
to it. To say this is to do no more than 
assert the maintenance of the "honour of the 
Crown" underlying all its Treaty 
relationships." 
Manukau Report (19/7/85; page 94) 
"We conclude that the Treaty did promise the 
tribes an interest in the harbour. That 
interest is certainly something more than that 
of a minority section of the general public, 
more than just a particular interest in 
particular fishing grounds, but less than that 
of exclusive ownership. 
It is in the nature of an interest in 
partnership the precise terms of which have yet 
to be worked out. In the meantime any legal 
owner should hold only as trustee for the 
partnership and acknowledge particular 
fiduciary responsibilities to the local tribes, 
and the general public, as distinct entities." 
Te Reo Maori Report (29/4/86; page 27): 
"We have considered this aspect of the case 
having regard to the particular words in the 
Treaty but in so doing we have not been 
unmindful of the broader social purpose of the 
contract without which no discussion of the 
Treaty can be complete. In that broader 
perspective, and as we have said in earlier 
findings, the Treaty was directed to ensuring a 
place for two peoples in this country. We 
question whether the principles and broad 
objectives of the Treaty can ever be achieved 
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if there is not a recognised place for the 
language of one of the partners of the Treaty. 
In the Maori perspective the place of the 
language in the life of the nation is 
indicative of the place of the people." 
(iii) Reference to the "principles", rather than the Treaty 
itself has broadened the bases for redress. 
While there have been allegations that the focusing on "the 
principles" is an attempt to diminish the Crown's Treaty 
obligations, and that the phrase "in accordance with and to 
give effect to the Treaty of Waitangi" is an appropriate 
substitute I consider that the principles have enabled the 
Courts and Tribunal to grant remedies that would not be 
available if matters were frozen at 1840. Maori would not, for 
example have been regarded as being entitled to deep sea 
fisheries as was found in the Muriwhenua report. The Tribunal 
would not have been able to consider claims relating to radio 
and television broadcasting as it was able to in the Te Reo 
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Maori claim. 
This broadening of scope has inevitably meant increased bases 
for redress and a more prominent place for the Treaty in Public 
Law. 
63 Muriwhenua Report page 212; Royal Commission Volume III 
Part 1 pp 105-106; Environmental Management and the Principles 
of the Treaty of Waitangi, Parliamentary Commission for the 
Environment page 12. 
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c. Administrative practices have developed which ensure the 
Treaty continues to be a part of the social and legal 
fabric. 
The following administrative development should assist in 
ensuring that the Treaty continues to be a part/increasing part 
of municipal law so long as there is a positive political will: 
(i) Cabinet decision of 23 June 1986 directing that all 
future legislation referred to Cabinet at policy 
approval stage should draw attention to any 
implications for recognition of the principles of 
the Treaty; that Departments should consult with 
appropriate Maori people on matters affecting the 
application of the Treaty, and the financial and 
resource implications of recognising the Treaty 
should be assessed whenever possible in future 
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reports. 
(ii) The government has issued responsiveness 
guidelines, as part of its partnership 
response, requiring Departments to focus on 
five areas: 
[l] Policy making 
Policy proposals will be reviewed by the 
Ministry of Maori Policy. 
[2] Corporate Planning 
64 CO (86)10; Royal Commission Volume III part 1 pages 112 
and 113 refers to Cabinet Directive having enhanced position of 
Treaty. 
(iii) 
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Treaty principles to be incorporated into 
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Corporate Plans. Maori input required. 
[3) Service Delivery 
Agencies to seek opportunities for working 
with iwi for contracts and agreements. 
[4] Personnel Policy 
The recruitment, training and promotion of 
Maori peofge within the State sector to be 
improved. 
[ 5 ] Accountability 
Ministers will require chief executives to 
implement the responsiveness measures. 
The Treaty is automatically being included as a 
consideration when bodies are established by government 
for example, the Royal Commission on Social Policy's 
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warrant referred to the Treaty. 
see for example pages 7 and 17 of the Inland Revenue 
Department's Corporate Plan (1 April 1989 - 30 June 1990) where 
reference is made to one of the Department's objectives being 
to recognise and help meet the needs of the Tangata Whenua; 
pages 1 and 7 of the State Services Commission Corporate Plan 
for the 1988/1989 financial year. One of the stated missions 
of the State Services Commission is to make State Services 
responsive to the needs of a culturally diverse community and 
there are both English and Maori texts. Both Departments have 
adopted Maori names. 
66 One of the steps taken to improve the recruitment of Maori 
people is to ensure that whanau can be present and interview 
panels have Maori representation in appropriate circumstances 
67 The Commission was instructed to consider the social and 
economic foundations of New Zealand, which was said to include 
the principles of the Treaty. 
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(iv) a number of units have been set up in Government 
68 
organisations to contribute to Treaty issues for 
example, 
Responsiveness Unit Sate Services Commission 
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Treaty of Waitangi Unit Justice Department 
Treaty of Waitangi Unit Crown Law Office 
Maori Secretariat Ministry for the Environment 
Maori Unit in Human Rights Commission 
Ministry of Women's Affairs has equal sharing 
of power and resources. 
68 Royal Commission Volume III part 1 page 113 refers to other 
examples. 
69 The "Department of Justice Resource Management Review 
(Strategos Consulting Limited), July 1989 has acknowledged the 
need for the unit to have a high profile in any Justice 
Organisation - see pages 5 to 8 of the Report. One of the 
conclusions in that report, however, is that "It is essential 
to build upon existing efforts with a conscious recognition of 
what is and is not realistic." 
70 
71 
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V. HOW DID THE TREATY COME TO HAVE ITS PRESENT POSITION? 
The answer to the question - How did the Treaty come to have 
its present position of relative preeminence in Public Law? 
must, to some degree at least, depend on one's view of how 
change occurs generally and what causes events in history, and 
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one's experiences in and perceptions of Society. In 
addition the question must raise general questions about the 
degree to which the law influences society or vice versa and 
the role and effect of individuals within the legal system. 
Undoubtedly there are many other factors which could be 
regarded as being relevant to any consideration of this matter 
or to the issue of the reasons for the generally high profile 
of the Treaty. Consequently, in a paper of this nature, it is 
only possible to proffer suggestions rather than carry out in 
depth analysis. 
What does seem clear is that the Treaty's relative preeminence 
in Public Law must be due to a multitude of factors rather than 
to one or a few prime considerations and the Treaty's position 
reflects the fact that the "right combination of factors" has 
occurred. To a degree there has been a "snowballing" effect, 
the more the Treaty is relied on the more people consider it 
can/should be relied on and the ,more people seek to refer to 
it. Claudia Oranges's statement that "there has been a 
rediscovery of the Treaty by Pakeha New Zealanders and a more 
articulate assertion of their Treaty rights by Maori New 
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Zealand" provides some but not all of the answer. 
The factors which, in combination, I would see as having 
contributed to the Treaty's present position include the 
following: 
see EH Carr, What is History?, London, 1961 for general 
discussion. 
Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi - A Historical Overview, 
Sector Volume II No 4 page 2. 
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(i) generally, Maori have always regarded the 
Treaty as a constitutional document as well as 
regarding it as a covenant or scared document 
72 
(Kawenata). At times when the Courts 
declined to recognise the Treaty and it was 
given limited or no recognition in Statutes 
Maori persistently pleaded the Treaty in the 
Courts and in petitions to parliament and the 
Queen. As stated in the Report of the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy: 
"Despite the Maori consensus that the 
Treaty has legal status and is a 
constitutional document, its standing 
in the existing legal system is 
controversial for many Pakeha. 
Maori people have persistently pleaded 
the Treaty in the Courts but with 
limited success .... The most notable 
Court cases are dated from 1847, then 
1877, 1881, 1902, 1912, 1914, 1956, 
1965, 1977, and 1987. The Courts 
adopted the conventional approach to 
treaties, particularly the general rule 
that a treaty must be incorporated by 
legislation 
72 Obviously there have been, and continue to be, divergences 
within Maoridom as to the status of the Treaty. The view that 
"The Treaty is a Fraud", which was proclaimed by protesters in 
the 1970's, seems to have disappeared however see for example 
"A Bill of Rights for New Zealand'', Legal Research Foundation 
Seminar, University of Auckland, August 1985, "Part II and 
clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights" Chief Judge 
ETJ Durie at page 190; The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law 
Society Seminar, April 1989 page 1 (PB Temm QC). 
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in municipal law. It is only in recent 
times that legislation has provided 
greater access to the courts and has 
enabled Maori people to plead the 
73 
Treaty .... " 
(ii) the relatively positive approach to the issue 
taken by Labour Governments, albeit at times 
in response to increasing pressure from Maori 
for greater recognition of the Treaty of 
Waitangi, and their grievances from its non 
implementation, and the recent indications of 
74 
some "backtracking". Examples of Labour 
Governments support are seen in legislative, 
as well as administrative matters. 
The Labour Government was responsible for 
enacting the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, and 
subsequent amendments, which has provided a 
mechanism for Treaty grievances to be 
75 
addressed. Similarly all the other 
Royal Commission Volume III part I page 91. See also page 
97 of the Royal Commission Report where reference is made to 
the kotahitanga movement presenting tribal and inter tribal 
grievances to the government in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century with the aim of protecting Maori rights 
under the Treaty of Waitangi; Muriwhenua Report 1988 Appendix 8 
"Maori Fishing Petitions'', as referred to the Native Affairs 
Committee. 
74 ETJ Durie "The Waitangi Tribunal: Its relationship with 
the Judicial System" (1986] NZLJ 235, referred to in CL Mander 
Indigenous Peoples and the Law Seminar paper "The Waitangi 
Tribunal". 
75 Amendments to the Act in 1985 greatly extended the 
Tribunal's powers of review back to 1840, and increased the 
number of members to 6, of whom at least 4 were to be Maori. 
Amendments to the Act in 1988 increased the membership of the 
Tribunal to the Chairman and 16 members and deleted the racial 
qualification. 
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legislation previously referred to which 
refers to the principles of the Treaty in 
some way, or Maori values, has been enacted 
76 
by a Labour government. 
In addition the Labour Government has 
approved increased research resources and 
funding to the Waitangi Tribunal and 
supported and funded the establishment of 
units throughout the State sector to deal 
with Treaty related matters. 
(iii) The Waitangi Tribunal itself, and its 
membership under Chief Judge Durie, have 
enabled the Treaty to attain a relatively 
high profile and provide the hope, if not the 
77 
reality, of grievances being redressed. 
In addition to making recommendations 
regarding specific claims the Tribunal has 
made submissions to Ministers and the 
government about Treaty related matters in 
circumstances which are not necessarily 
directly within its jurisdiction. The most 
notable occasion on which this has occurred 
is probably in relation to the State Owned 
e.g., Waitangi Day Act 1976, Conservation Act 1986, 
Environment Act 1986, State Owned Enterprises Act 1988, Maori 
Language Act 1987, Law Commission Act 1985 and the State Sector 
Act 1988. 
77 The parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, in 
"Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty of 
Waitangi", Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
November 1988 maintains that very few of the Waitangi 
Tribunal's recommendations have in fact been followed. See 
also The Treaty o~ Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 pp 23-29 (WM Wilson); MPK Sorenson "Towards a 
Radical Reinterpretation of New Zealand History: The role of 
the Waitangi Tribunal" Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives 
of the Treaty of Waitangi 91989) Edit by IH Kawharu, 161. 
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Enterprises Bill, although there were other 
occasions on which the Tribunal considered 
that it was appropriate to act when it was 
considering the Muriwhenua fisheries claim: 
"This began as a land/fisheries claim in 
1985. The Tribunal made an interim report on 
8.12.1986 on the State Owned Enterprises Bill 
as being prejudicial to the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi. This resulted in the 
Bill being amended to include section 9 .... 
Two days later another interim report was 
issued about the allocation of ITQ under the 
Fisheries Act 1986 being prejudicial to the 
Muriwhenua claim. The Tribunal warned of the 
need for compensation if the allocation of 
ITQ went ahead. The Minister declined to 
act. Finally a memorandum in September 1987 
prompted the Crown to negotiate when the 
Tribunal made a finding that the Crown must 
bargain for any public right to commercial 
78 
exploitation of the fisheries. 
The Tribunal has also provided the basis for the ongoing 
development of a Treaty jurisprudence. The Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975, under which the Waitangi Tribunal is constituted 
gives the Tribunal the flexibility which is necessary to enable 
The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 page 61 (Kenderdine) see also other references to 
the Waitangi Tribunal being used as a form of injunctive relief 
in the Kaituna and Te Atiawa claims. 
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it to develop practical solutions/recommendations which are 
acceptable to the government, the claimants and the courts. 
The Court of Appeal in the New Zealand Maori Council (supra) 
case, for example, referred approvingly to the findings of the 
Waitangi Tribunal and implied that the recommendations of the 
79 
Tribunal should generally be followed. 
The fact that the legislation enables the Tribunal to adopt an 
80 
inquisitorial , rather than an adverserial role, and to 
At page 661 (Cooke P) referred to the fact that the 
opinions of the Waitangi Tribunal should be given weight 
although they were not binding on the Court; at page 664 (Cooke 
P) stated that it would only be in very special circumstances 
that the Crown could fulfil its duty to act as a reasonable 
Treaty partner and decline to follow a Tribunal recommendation. 
But see also page 689 (Somers J), Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board 
and Others v Attorney General and Others CP 553, 559, 610 and 
614/87, 19 May 1989 - The High Court referred to the fact it 
was not bound by the Waitangi Tribunal's findings, and 
consequently to the limitations of that body's findings 
although it also indicated that some regard should be had to 
its recommendations. 
80 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Second Schedule Clause 6 
provides the Tribunal with wide powers to admit evidence, 
whether it would be legally admissible or not; clause 8 
provides that the Tribunal is a Commission of Inquiry; the 
Tribunal often engages its own researchers to provide the 
factual basis for considering a claim. 
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operate as a bicultural body has undoubtedly assisted in 
the Tribunal attaining a position of legitimacy in the eyes of 
the government, the claimants and the Courts, if not in the 
eyes of the Public at large. The Waitangi Tribunal has become 
the acknowledged "focal point" for Treaty matters and this is 
recognised by the fact that it has been given some powers of 
final determination under the Treaty of Waitangi State Owned 
82 
Enterprises Act 1988 and the Crown Forests Assets Act 1989. 
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, Second Schedule clause 5(9) 
provides that "Except as expressly provided in this Act, the 
Tribunal may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks 
fit, and in doing so may have regard to and adopt such aspects 
of te kawa o te marae as the Tribunal thinks appropriate in the 
particular case, but shall not deny any person the right to 
speak during the proceedings of the Tribunal on the ground of 
that person's sex." 
The adoption of Marae protocol necessarily requires changes 
from Court room procedure. 
82 The Treaty of Waitangi State Owned Enterprises Act 1988 
establishes a procedure to ensure that no future claimants to 
the Tribunal are prejudiced by the transfer of Crown land to 
State Owned Enterprises i.e., any land transferred has to have 
a memorial registered on the certificate of title stating that 
it would return to the Crown if the Waitangi Tribunal 
recommended it should and no contrary agreement could be 
reached; section 10 provides that if no agreement can be 
reached with the Crown in relation to the Tribunal's 
recommendation for its return the Tribunal's recommendation 
will be binding. 
The provisions in the Crown Forests Assets Act 1989 relating to 
Waitangi Tribunal claims are based on the provisions in the 
Treaty of Waitangi State Owned Enterprises Act 1988. 
The Act provides that where a claim is made to the Waitangi 
Tribunal relating to Crown forest land that is subject to a 
Crown forest licence and the Tribunal recommends that the land 
should be returned to Maori ownership the Crown must -
(i) return the land to Maori ownership but subject to 
the Crown Forestry licence; and 
(ii) pay compensation to Maori in accordance with the 
provisions of the first schedule. 
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(iv) Maori have made more ardent and frequent 
claims for the recognition of the Treaty 
before the Waitangi Tribunal, the Courts and 
the Government. The determined nature of the 
Maori claimants can be seen for example in the 
watershed Atiawa Waitangi Tribunal claim, the · 
New Zealand Maori Council case (supra) T..he 
Love Case (supra), the Ngaitahu case (supra), 
the many interlocutory proceedings of the 
Fisheries claim and the ongoing Tainui case. 
It is arguable, to some degree at least, that 
declining economic circumstances and growing 
unemployment has provided an added impetus for 
claims to be pursued. 
(v) New Zealanders' attitudes to Treaty issues 
have undoubtedly been influenced by 
international developments involving 
indigenous peoples and human rights generally 
and New Zealands' emerging role in the 
international community. The growth of groups 
such as HART and CARE, the tensions and 
awareness arising from Springbok tours and the 
diversion of anti racism groups resources into 
"home issues" increased the Treaty profile. 
(vi) the proliferation of written material about 
the Treaty in relatively recent times has in 
turn created interest and further written 
work. 
The work of people such as A. Ward, "A Show of 
Justice", C. Orange, PG McHugh, C Orange IH 
Kawharu (to name only a few) provides a 
significant base for others to build on. 
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(vii) the willingness of the Courts, including the 
Court of Appeal, to have regard to the social 
developments that have and are taking place in 
New Zealand and internationally. This 
awareness of the Courts is reflected 
particularly in the New Zealand Maori Council 
~ (supra) and Huakina (supra) decision. It 
goes without saying that individual judges 
have played an important role in this 
development process, just as judges such as 
Prendergast J had some responsibility for 
removing the Treaty to a state of oblivion. 
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YI IS IT NECESSARY FOR THE TREATY TO BE PART OF MUNICIPAL LAW, 
YIA EITHER INDIVIDUAL STATUTE OR A BILL OF RIGHTS, FOR IT 
TO BE EFFECTIVE? 
A. Arguments against needing to incorporate the Treaty. 
As discussed above it can be argued that the need to 
incorporate the Treaty has diminished given the Courts' and 
Tribunal's willingness to use the Treaty as an aid to 
interpretation and to recognise customary rights, the prospect 
of the Te Heuheu (supra) decision being challenged in the 
future and the possibility of alternative remedies being 
developed via the principle of partnership. 
An additional argument against incorporating the Treaty itself 
would be that the incorporating of the Treaty, as opposed to 
the principles, would result in more restrictive 
interpretations being imposed than at present given that the 
"principles" allow a more liberal interpretation to be placed 
on the Treaty. 
While both arguments are valid the Treaty's ~~sition is 
obviously more secure by being incorporated. In addition it 
would undoubtedly be the principles rather than the Treaty that 
would continue to be incorporated and even if it were not the 
B3 .lb.id, 97. Referred to New Zealand Maori Council Somers J 
at page 398 "Neither the provisions of the Treaty of Waitangi 
nor its principles are a matter of law, a restraint on the 
legislative supremacy of Parliament" as indicating a need for 
protection. 
69 
Courts do/would regard the Treaty and the principles as 
synonymous in any case. In the New Zealand Maori Council Case, 
for example, Somers J stated that "A breach of a Treaty 
provision must in my view be a breach of the principles of the 
84 
Treaty ..... " 
B. Assuming that it is accepted that the Treaty/principles of 
the Treaty should be incorporated is it sufficient for it 
to be incorporated via individual statute or should it be 
entrenched in a Bill of Rights? 
The consideration of the issue of whether the Treaty should be 
entrenched in a Bill of Rights is to some degree academic given 
that the Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on "a 
white paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand" has 
recommended that a Bill of Rights which is an ordinary statute 
(i.e., is not a supreme law and not entrenched) be adopted, and 
that it would not be appropriate to include the Treaty in such 
a Bill of Rights. (Copy of the relevant extract at Appendix H) 
Assuming, however, that an entrenched Bill of Rights (requiring 
the support of 75 percent of the members of parliament or a 
majority at a referendum of electors for amendment) is still a 
possibility, and that the Treaty would be included in the way 
suggested in the White Paper, possible arguments for and 
84 page 693 see also Cooke Pat page 663; Richardson J at page 
672; The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 page 19 (Durie) and at pages 48-53 (Kenderdine); 
Waitangi Tribunal in Motonui Report paragraph 10-1. 
Clause 4(2) the Draft Bill of Rights provided that: 
(2) The Treaty of Waitangi shall be regarded as 
always speaking and shall be applied to 
circumstances as they arise so that effect may be 
given to its spirit and true intent. 
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against such an entrenchment would include those set out 
85 
below. 
(i) Reasons for entrenchment 
the incorporation of the Treaty via individual 
statute, rather than through a Bill of Rights, 
is necessarily a piecemeal approach which means 
that the Treaty does not have a proper place as 
the basis of the Constitution and, by 
implication at least, that its effectiveness is 
reduced. 
Part II Clause 4 of the proposed Bill of Rights provided: 
"4. The Treaty of Waitangi 
(1) The rights of the Maori people under the Treaty of 
Waitangi are hereby recognised and affirmed. 
(2) The Treaty of Waitangi shall be regarded as always 
speaking and shall be applied in circumstances as 
they arise so that effect may be given to its 
spirit and true intent. 
(3) The Treaty of Waitangi means the Treaty as set out 
in English and Maori in the schedule to this Bill 
of Rights. 
Part VI Clause 26 stated: 
26 Reference to Waitangi Tribunal 
where in any proceeding before any court, any 
question arises whether any enactment or rule of 
law, or any act or policy, is consistent with the 
Treaty of Waitangi, the court may on the 
application of any party to the proceeding or of 
its own motion refer that question to the Waitangi 
Tribunal for a report and opinion and the court 
shall have regard to that report and opinion". FM 
Brookefield "The New Zealand Constitution" in 
"Waitangi, Maori and Pakeha perspectives on the 
Treaty of Waitangi" page 17. 
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Professor FM Brookfield, for example, has 
argued that the Treat~
6
should have been in the 
Constitution Act 1852 ; similarly a recurrent 
theme at the Waitangi hui in 1985 was that the 
Treaty should not be incorporated into ordinary 
statute law but should be entrenched in 
constitutional law as the only, or at least the 
87 
principal, basis of our constitution. 
the entrenchment of the Treaty would mean 
Courts and Governments would be required to 
acknowledge it, they could not ignore the 
Treaty in the way that is presently possible 
and has occurred in the past. For example 
applicants to the Waitangi Tribunal would 
appear to have direct redress in the Courts by 
virtue of a Bill of Rights if recommendations 
of the Waitangi Tribunal were not adopted 
whereas at present no clear cause of action 
88 
seems to exist. 
86 FM Brookefield "The New Zealand Constitution" in "Waitangi, 
Maori and Pakeha perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi" pages 
15-16. 
87 A Bill of Rights for New Zealand, a white paper, page 36. 
88 Waitangi Tribunal recommendations have not been followed. 
While Cooke Pin the New Zealand Maori Council case implied 
there was a requirement for the recommendations of the Tribunal 
to be followed, except in very special circumstances, if the 
Crown was to be a reasonable Treaty Partner that requirement 
has not been tested and it may only apply where reference is 
made to the principles of the Treaty in a specific statute 
anyway. (see page 664 of the decision). 
For analysis of the way the Treaty has been forgotten in the 
past see "A Bill of Rights for" New Zealand, Legal Research 
Foundation Seminar, University of Auckland, August 1985, "Part 
II and clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights "Chief 
Judge ETJ Durie at page 173. 
89 
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Similarly it would not be open to the Executive 
to decline to have regard to the Treaty when 
enacting or amending legislation, as is the 
case at present. This is particularly 
important, if the Treaty is to retain a 
profile, given that the Government has shown 
signs recently of "backtracking" on the whole 
Treaty issue and the opposition does not appear 
to have any commitment to the Treaty. 
entrenchment of the Treaty would make it clear 
that the Crown wanted to give it full effect 
and make the Crown an honorable partner, 
whereas the Crown's intentions have been open 
to doubt in the past because of the absence of 
a clear and binding commitment by the Crown. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy, for 
example, considered that entrenchment was 
necessary to bind the partners legally and to 
provide a direct source of rights and said that 
the cementing of the Treaty in this way would 
make it clear that the Crown wanted to give it 
full effect and make the Crown an honorable 
89 
partner. 
Royal Commission Volume III Part 1 page 98. 
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while the doctrine of aboriginal title, which 
means that Maori have customary rights 
irrespective of the Treaty, has received some 
recent endorsement it has yet to be openly 
adopted by the Courts and cannot provide the 
same protection of rights that the Treaty can. 
Consequently it is essential that the Treaty be 
given the strongest protection possible. 
(ii) Reasons against entrenchment 
the Treaty is "such a sacred document that toying 
with it by including it in such a thing as a Bill 
of Rights, might somehow make it profane" The 
Treaty has been described as an agreement, contract 
or compact or as an arra~aement. 
Maori it is a Covenant." As 
Judge Durie in 1985: 
But for many 
stated by Chief 
"The Treaty has been re-established as a sacred 
document so that nothing short of full 
recognition in unadulterated form can give 
91 
satisfaction or restore honour". 
a fear that the Crown's intentions are not 
honourable, that the intention of the Bill of 
Rights is not to honour the Treaty but rather just 
a further attempt to reduce Maori authority and 
power. There is a fear that the Bill is merely an 
attempt to confuse the issue of honouring the 
92 
Treaty further. 
9o The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society Seminar, 
April 1989 page 18 (Durie); "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand", 
Legal Research Foundation Seminar, University of Auckland, 
August 1985 "Te Tiriti O Waitangi" Shane Jones 209 - 217. 
91 "A Bill of Rights for New Zealand", Legal Research 
Foundation Seminar, University of Auckland, August 1985, "Part 
II and clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights" page 
190. 
92 Ibid 
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a fear that Part II of the Bill of Rights was a 
direct attempt to counteract the recent 
endorsements of the doctrine of aboriginal title, 
that it was aimed at reversing an inevitable 
verdict of history that indigenous minorities have 
particular rights, that native rights arise by 
virtue of the Common Law and do not depend on 
93 
Treaties. 
the view that the Treaty was already being given 
effect and consequently entrenchment in a Bill of 
Rights was not necessary; the view in effect, that 
the piecemeal approach to date had in fact been 
effective. For example, the Cabinet minute 
requiring Departments to have regard to the Treaty 
had meant that it was being included in an 
increasing number of individual statutes and the 
Waitangi Tribunal and the Courts were ensuring that 
94 
Treaty issues were being effectively addressed. 
While it is acknowledged that there has been a growth of the 
references to the Treaty in individual statutes over recent 
years, and hence an increased profile for the Treaty, there is 
no guarantee that those references will continue to exist or 
increase in number in the future and consequently there is no 
assured protection for the Treaty in such a piecemeal approach. 
Although entrenchment would not, in the absence of a provision 
excluding amendment, guarantee the Treaty's legal position it 
would at least prevent Courts and Governments being able to 
.I..Qid, 173 (Durie) 
94 While the Royal Commission on Social Policy favoured 
entrenchment it commented on the effectiveness of the Cabinet 
minute - Volume III Part 1 page 113; One of the reasons given 
by the Justice and Law Reform Committee reporting on the white 
paper on a Bill of Rights for not entrenching the Treaty in a 
statute was the fact that it was already being effectively 
addressed. 
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easily ignore it and provide it with a degree of protection 
which is unprecedented in its history (others have suggested 
that even stronger protection is necessary, that it should not 
be subject to amendment by 75% of a national referendum; that 
there should be a special constitutional Court of Appeal to 
95 
make ultimate decisions on the Treaty). 
I consider that entrenchment is the only means available to the 
Maori people for ensuring that the Treaty is given ongoing 
acknowledgment, if it is accepted that there is a need for 
incorporation and the
9
~resent monocultural legal system 
continues to operate. Consequently while Maori fears that 
any attempt to entrench the Treaty has some "hidden agenda" 
which is not favourable to the Maori partner is understandable 
I believe that entrenchment is their most favourable option at 
present. Similarly, while it is accepted that entrenchment 
does not allow for the sacredness of the Treaty to be 
acknowledged the same can be said for the incorporation of the 
Treaty/Treaty principles in individual statutes and that occurs 
without the protections from a Bill of Rights. 
In view of the protections which a Bill of Rights can offer the 
Treaty it is to be hoped that the short term proposal to have a 
Bill of Rights, which is an ordinary statute does not mean that 
there is no hope of a Bill of Rights, which entrenches the 
Treaty, being adopted in the near future. 
95 FM Brookfield "The New Zealand Constitution" in Waitangi, 
Maori and Pakeha perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi" page 
17. 
96 The Royal Commission on Social Policy also favoured 
entrenchment, as does Chief Judge ETJ Durie, see for example "A 
Bill of Rights for New Zealand", Legal Research Foundation 
Seminar, University of Auckland, August 1985, "Part II and 
Clause 26 of the Draft New Zealand Bill of Rights" page 171, 
pages 187-188 and page 193. 
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CONCLUSION 
As indicated in the introduction the aim of this paper is to 
assess the degree to which the New Zealand situation is 
required to comply with the principle that the Treaty of 
Waitangi must be incorporated into municipal law in order for 
the Treaty to have a position in Public Law. 
In brief, for the reasons set out in detail in the paper and in 
summary below, I consider that the Treaty does and can continue 
to have an important role in Public Law in spite of the 
apparent continued adherence by the Courts to the principle 
that the Treaty must be incorporated for it to be of effect. 
This position has been achieved not only because there has in 
fact been a liberalisation of the "need for incorporation'' 
principle but also because there has been a great increase in 
the instances of the Treaty being incorporated into statutes in 
recent years. 
Liberalisation of the principle means that the Treaty has 
effect even when it is not incorporated 
While the Courts regarded the Treaty as legally binding 
following its signing the prevailing view historically was that 
the Treaty had to be incorporated for it to be of effect. This 
view was clearly expounded in the cases of Te Heuheu (supra), 
Nireaha (supra) and Waipapakura (supra) (The minority view, 
that the Treaty was effective to create rights was reflected in 
the kauwaeranga judgment). 
Despite the fact that the Courts have continued to maintain in 
recent decisions, including the New Zealand Maori Council, 
Weepu, Re The Bed of the Wanganui River and Keepa cases, that 
the Treaty must be incorporated into municipal law for it to be 
effective there has been some liberalisation of the principle 
which means that the Treaty is of effect even when it is not 
incorporated in some circumstances. 
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Specific ways in which the Courts have relied on the Treaty, 
despite the fact it has not been incorporated, have been to 
interpret legislation so it is not in breach of the Treaty 
(e.g., Huakina, as reinforced in New Zealand Maori Council), to 
give content to general language in legislation by reference to 
the Treaty (e.g., Te Weehi, Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board and 
Hakaraia) and to acknowledge the Treaty as evidence of or 
declaratory of an existing customary position (e.g., Somers J 
in New Zealand Maori Council, Re Lundon, Nireaha, Baldick). In 
addition it has been suggested by one commentator that the 
Treaty could be used as a basic limit on legislative power in 
an extreme case. 
In view of the developments that have occurred it also seems 
likely that an argument that the Treaty does not need to be 
incorporated could now be successful in an appropriate case. 
Factors in support of such an argument could include the fact 
that there has been a liberalisation of the principle; that 
developments in human rights generally and indigenous peoples 
customary rights specifically make such a principle 
unacceptable; the principles applying to partnerships, as 
opposed to Treaties, are relevant in the light of the llilli 
Zealand Maori Council case. 
The Treaty has a position in Public Law irrespective of the 
principle because it has been incorporated 
As indicated in Part IV of the paper the Treaty has an 
important part of present and undoubtedly future public law, 
irrespective of whether it has been incorporated, by virtue of 
the fact that it is referred to in a growing number of Statutes 
and Bills. In addition the reference to the "Principles of the 
Treaty" in statutes has inevitably broadened the bases for 
redress, laid the foundation for prolific case law on the 
meaning of the principles in the future and provided the scope 
for the development of the principle of partnership. 
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Similarly, administrative practices have developed which will 
ensure that the Treaty continues to be a part of New Zealand's 
social and legal framework. 
Given the important position that the Treaty has attained the 
further question that needs to be answered is whether the 
Treaty needs to be incorporated in a Bill of Rights for it to 
have a position in Public Law and be effective in the future. 
While the fact that the Treaty has attained its present 
position without being entrenched in a Bill of Rights in itself 
provides some argument for such an entrenchment being 
unnecessary I consider that, on balance, some additional 
protection is necessary if the Treaty's position is to be 
guaranteed. 
The waning fortunes of the Treaty in the past and the factors 
referred to as indicating how the Treaty has come to have its 
present relatively favourable position (persistence and ardour 
of Maori in pleading the Treaty, positive approach by Labour 
Governments, membership and procedures of the Waitangi 
Tribunal, international developments, willingness of Courts to 
have regard to social developments) serve as indicators of the 
Treaty's vulnerability. 
The problem is that despite the present "relatively positive 
environment" there are no guarantees that the necessary 
Political will, as well as other necessary factors, can be 
retained. To the contrary, there are signs of waning 
enthusiasm if not "backtracking" by the present government. 
If the problems of the past of the Treaty suffering ebbs and 
flows, are to be avoided then the Treaty needs stronger 
protection, as would be obtained from entrenchment in a Bill of 
Rights. 
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APPEND/XL .. 
PRINCIPLES OF :THE TREATY OF WA/TANG/ AS 
PROPOSED BY-·APPLICANTS AND PLAINTIFFS JN 
THE NEW ZEALAND MAORI COUNCIL COURT OF 
APPEAL CASE (1987) 
proposed by the New Zealand Maori Council 
. - . .. t ' , \., . 
\ ' .· , I - ~ ' . • ' 
The Crown duty to actively protect to the fullest extent practicable. -
The jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate omiis~ions_ 
A relationship analogous to a fiduciary duty. 
The duty to consult. 
The honour of the Crown. 
The duty to make good past breaches. 
The duty to return land for land. 
That the Maori way of life would be protected .. 
That the parties would be of equal status. 
. I I 
Where the Maori interest in their taonga is adversely affected, that priority would be 
grven to Maori values. 
Proposed by the Crown , 
That a settled form of civil government was desirable and that the British Crown should 
exercise the power of Government 
That the power of the British Crown to govern included the power to legislate for all 
matters relating to 'peace and good order'. 
That Maori chieftainship over their lands, forests, fisheries and other treasures was not 
extinguished. and would be protected and guaranteed. 
That the protection of the Crown should be extended to the Maori both by way of making 
them British subjects and by prohibition of sale of land to persons other than the Crown. 
That the Crown should have the pre-emptive right to acquire land from the Maori at 
agreed prices, should they wish to dispose of it. 
(So ur,:,e : NZ Court of Appeal, Cooke P, pp. 13-14) 
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Table 2: Summary o
f Principles of the Tr
eaty of Waitangi 
defined by the Waita
ngi Tribunal and the 
Court of Appeal 
Waitangl Tribunal 
(see Appendix J) 
E ESSENTIAL BARGAI
N 
e exchange of the right to 
ma~e _ laws 
rthe obligation to prote
ct Maon interests. (1
) 
ARTNERSHIP 
e Treaty implies a partne
rs~ip, 
xercised with utmost g
ood faith. (2) 
he Treaty is an agreem
ent that 
n be adapted to meet n
ew 
circumstances. (3) 
The needs of both Mao
ri and the wider 
community must be me
t, which will 
require compromises o
n both sides. (4) 
The courtesy of early c
onsultation. (9) 
The principle of choice
: Maori, Pakeha, 
and bicultural options. 
(12) 
ACTIVE PROTECTIO
N 
The Maori interest sho
uld be actively 
protected by the Crow
n. (5) 
The granting of the rig
ht of pre-emption 
to the Crown implies a
 reciprocal duty 
for the Crown to ensu
re that the tangata 
whenua retain sufficie
nt endowment for 
their fo reseen needs. 
(6) 
The Crown cannot ev
ade its obligations 
under the Treaty by c
onferring its 
authority on some oth
er body. (7) 
The 'taonga · to be pr
otected includes all 
valued resources and
 intangible cultural 
assets. ( 11) 
TRIB AL RANGATIRA
TANGA 
T~e Crown obligation
 to legally recognise 
tn_bal rangatiratanga. 
(8) 
Tino rangatiratanga • 
includes managemen
t 
of resources and othe
r taonga according to
 
Maori cultural prefere
nces. (10) 
Court of Appeal 
(see Appendix K) 
The acquisition of so
vereignty in ex-
change for the protec
tion of rangatira-
tanga. (1) 
The Treaty requires 
a partnership and 
the duty to act reaso
nably and in good 
faith (the responsibili
ties of the parties 
being analogous to fi
duciary duties) . (2) 
The freedom of the C
rown to govern for 
the whole community
 without unreason-
able restriction. (3) 
Maori duty of loyalty 
to the Queen, full 
acceptance of her Go
vernment through 
her responsible Minis
ters, and reason-
able cooperation. (7)
 
The duty of the Crow
n is not merely 
passive but extends 
to active protection-
of the Maori people i
n the use of their 
lands, and other gua
ranteed taonga to 
the fullest extent pra
cticable . (4) 
The obligation to gra
nt at least some form
 
of redress for grievan
ces where these 
are established. (5) 
Maori to retain chieft
anship (rangatiratang
a) 
over their resources 
and taonga and to 
have all the rights an
d privileges of citizen
-
ship. (6) 
Note: This wording is
 a summary from orig
inal sources. Number
ing refers to text in A
ppendices J and 
K. For principles defin
ed by NZ Maori Coun
cil and the Crown in t
he case before the C
ourt of Appeal, 
and the Royal Comm
ission on Social Polic
y, see Appendices L
and M. 
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APPENDIXJ-
PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY OF WA/TANG/ AS 
DEFINED BY THE WA/TANG/ TRIBUNAL (1983-1988) 
Principles that can be identified from the decisions of the Waitangi Tribunal are discussed 
below: 
1 THE EXCHANGE OF THE RIGHT TO MAKE LAWS FOR THE OBLIGATION 
TQ PROTECT MAORI INTERESTS 
This concept was expressed in the Manukau report as follows: 
"[kawanatanga) means the authority to make laws for the good order and security 
of the country but subject to an undertaking to protect particular Maori 
interests." ' ·  
In the Motunui report, the Tribunal said: 
"[The Treaty of Waitangi represents] an exchange of gifts . ... The gift of the right 
to make laws, and the promise to do so so as to accord the Maori interest an 
appropriate priority.· 
and (as also later confirmed in the Orakei report): 
"The Treaty was an acknowledgement of Maori existence, of their prior occupa-
tion of the land and of an intent that the Maori presence would remain and be 
respected. It made us one country, but acknowledged that we were two people. 
It established the regim_e not for uni- culturalism but for bi-culturalism. • 2 
The Muriwhenua report stated that: 
"The principle that emerges is the protection of Maori interests to the extent 
consistent with the cession of sovereignty. " 3 
2 THE TREATY IMPLIES A PARTNERSHIP, EXERCISED WITH UTMOST 
GOOD FAITH 
The principle of partnership was first stated by the Tribunal in the Manukau report: 
"The interests recognised by the Treaty give rise to a partnership, the precise 
terms of which. have yet to be worked out." ' 
Subsequent to the Court of Appeal case, the Orakei and Muriwhenua reports reiterated and 
supported the judgement of the Court that the leading principles of the Treaty are (a) that it 
1 MANUKAU, p. 90 
2 MOTUNUI, p. 61, ORAKEI, p. 130 
3 MURIWHENUA. p. 191 
4 MANUKAU, p. 95 
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signifies a partnership between the races, and (b) that it obliges bpth partners to act towards each other in utmost good faith. 1 
Further treatment of this theme can be found in Appendix K. 
3 THE TREATY IS AN AGREEMENT THAT CAN BE ADAPTED TO MEET NEW CIRCUMSTANCES 
Tribunal decisions make it clear the Treaty must move with the times and adapt to remain relevant. The Motunui report states: · 
"The Treaty was also more than an affirmation of existing rights. It was not intended to merely fossilise a status quo, but to provide a direction for future growth and development. The broad and general nature.of its words indicates it was not intended as a finite social contract but as the foundation for a developing social contract .... 
We consider that the Treaty is capable of a measure of adaptation to meet new and changing circumstances provided there is a measure of consent and adherence to its broad principles." 6 
Chief Judge Durie in the Waiheke report stated: 
"The preamble to our governing Act directs, in my view, that the Treaty is to be always speaking - it is to be made relevant to our times." 1 
4 THE NEEDS OF BOTH MAORI AND THE WIDER COMMUNITY MUST BE MET, WHICH WILL REQUIRE COMPROMISES ON BOTH SIDES 
On the matter of compromise, the Motunui report states: 
"It is not inconsistent with the Treaty of Waitangi that the Crown and Maori people should agree upon a measure of compromise and change. In particular, it is not inconsistent with the Treaty that the Te Atiawa hapu should accept a degree of pollution in respect of certain of their fishing grounds, on the basis that other grounds will not be spoilt." 8 
This principle was reiterated in the Orakei report. 11 In the Te Reo Maori report, the Tribunal stated: 
"The Treaty was directed to ensuring a place for two peoples in this country. We question whether the principles and broad objectives of the Treaty can ever be achieved if there is not a recognised place for the language of one of the partners to the Treaty. In the Maori perspective the place of the language in the life of the nation is indicative of the place of the people." '0 
5 ORAKEI, pp. 147-148, MURIWHENUA, pp. 190-192 
6 MOTUNUI, p. 61 
7 WAIHEKE, p. 82 
;, MOTUNUI, p. 62 
9 ORAKEI, p. 137 
10 TE REO MAORI, p. 29 
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The Tribunal commented as follows in the Muriwhenua report: 
" ... neither partner in our view cs.n demand their owt?-benefits if there is not also an adherence to reasonable state objectives of common benefit. It ought not to be forgotten that there were pledges on both sides." " 
In the Mangonui report, the Tribunal discussed this principle further: 
"It was a condition of the Treaty that the Maori possession of lands and fisheries would be guaranteed. The guarantee requires a high priority for Maori interests when works impact on Maori lands or particular fisheries for their guarantee was a ~ery small price to pay for the rights of sovereignty and settlement that Maori conferred. In other cases however, it is a careful balancing of interests that is required. It was inherent in the Treaty's terms that Maori customary values would be properly respected, but it was also an objective of the Treaty to secure a British settlement and a place where two people could fully belong. To achieve that end the needs of· both cultures must be provided for, and where necessary, reconciled." 12 
The principle relating to the question of balance was stated succinctly in the Waiheke report, and reinforced in the Muriwhenua report as follows: 
"It is out of keeping with the spirit of the Treaty ... that the resolution of one injustice should be seen to create another." 13 
The Motunui decision commented on the concept of an ·exclusive user', stating that: 
"the mana of the Maori people to be able to control their own fishing grounds ought to be upheld. This includes the power to regulate and restrict both the use and the class of persons who may use. It does not follow however, that there must in all cases be an exclusive user but rather that that is a matter to be determined in consultation and negotiation with the hapu concerned. We noted that ... [the claimants] do not seek an exclusive user ... this approach is consistent with Maori customs and values." " 
In the Manukau report, the Tribunal discussed the concept as follows: 
" ... we do not think the Maori interest in the seas is the 'full exclusive and undisturbed possession' of the English text. European New Zealanders need this Treaty too because by it the Maori people agreed to and accepted the existing and projected settlements and emigration referred (o in the preamble and thereby agreed that the Europeans too would 'belong'. Both parties stood to gain by this Treaty as partners in a new enterprise. The new partner necessarily needed access. The European's interest in the harbour and foreshore areas cannot be denied either. 
11 MURIWHENUA, p 195 
12 MANGONUI, p. 60 
13 WAIHEKE, p. 99, MURIWHENUA. p. xxi 
14 MOTUNUI, p. 63 
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We suspect that the original Maori signatories would have-appreciated this and 
that the subsequent claims to exclusive ownership reflect the total denial of the 
Maori mana in the laws of the seas and fisheries. Those who appeared before us 
claiming that the Manukau belonged to them spoke of the Maori willingness to 
share the Manukau. They spoke also of the belittlement they felt when their 'first 
nation' status was relegated to that of 'an ethnic minority'. 
We conclude that the Treaty did promise the tribes an interest in the harbour. That 
interest is certainly something more than that of a minority section of the general 
public, more than just a particular interest in particular fishing grounds, but less 
than that of exclusive ownership. It is in the nature of an interest in partnership 
the precise terms of which have yet to be worked out. In the meantime any legal 
owner should hold only as trustee for the partnership and acknowledge particular 
fiduciary responsibilities to the local tribes, and the gene;a1 public, as distinct 
entities." 15 
5 THE MAORI INTEREST SHOULD BE ACTIVELY PROTECTED BY THE 
CROWN 
As noted in no. 1 above, 'kawanatanga' means the authority to make laws for the good order 
and security of the country, but subject to an undertaking to protect particular Maori interests. 
The Tribunal has stated the possessory guarantees of the second article must be read in 
conjunction with the preamble, where the Crown 'is anxious to protect' the natives against the 
outcomes of emigration and with the 'royal protection· conferred in the third article, and said 
in the Manukau report: 
"The Treaty of Waitangi obliges the Crown not only to recognise the Maori 
interests specified in the Treaty but actively to protect them . ... It follows that the 
omission to provide that protection is as much a breach of the Treaty as a positive 
act that removes those rights." 16 
This point was made again in the report on Te Reo Maori, and reiterated in the Orakei report 
as follows: 
"fin Te Reo Maori) . .. it was submitted that the word 'guarantee' meant more than 
merely leaving the Maori people unhindered in their enjoyment of language and 
culture. It required active steps to be taken to ensure that the Maori people have 
and retain the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their language and 
culture. " 17 
In the Muriwhenua report, the Tribunal noted that the guarantees in the Treaty assured that: 
" ... despite settlement Maori would survive and because of it they would also 
progress . .. to achieve that . .. the Crown had not merely to protect those natural 
resources Maori might wish to retain, but to assure the retention of a sufficient 
share from which they could survive and profit, and the facility to fully exploit 
them." 18 
15 MANUKAU, p. 94 
16 MANUKAU, p. 95 
17 TE REO MAORI, p. 29, ORAKEI p. 135 
18 MURIWHENUA. p. 194 
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6 THE GRANTING OF THE RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION TO THE CROWN IMPLIES A RECIPROCAL DUTY FOR THE CROWN TO ENSURE THAT THE TANGA TA WHENUA RETAIN SUFFICIENT ENDOWMENT FOR THEIR FORESEEN NEEDS . 
Judge Durie in the Waiheke claim found that this was a principle of the Treaty, but the Tribunal was not unanimous on that point through the dissenting opinion on that claim of member Mr J Q Poole. 
19 
In the Orakei report, however, considerable research was undertaken into the historical context of the Treaty, and the opinion of Judge Durie in the Waiheke claim was supported. As summarised in the Orakei report: . 
\ ~ 
"It is abundantly evident . .. that Lord Normanby, in instructing Captain Hobson to obtain for the Crown the right of the pre-emption of Maori land, and in stipulating · how such right was to be exercised, made it clear that no land was to be so purchased which was needed to provide for the comfort and subsistence of the Maori people. In short, they were to be left with a sufficient endowment for their own needs. An official protector was to ensure this. The right of pre-emption was to be a limited right. It was not to extend to land needed by the Maori .... 
. . . we find that Article 2, read as a whole, imposed on the Crown certain duties and responsibilities, the first to ensure that the Maori people in fact wished to sell; the second to ensure that they were left with sufficient land for their maintenance and support or livelihood or, as Chief Judge Durie puts it in the Waiheke Report ... that each tribe maintained a sufficient endowment for its foreseen needs." 20 
7 THE CROWN CANNOT EVADE ITS OBL/GA TIONS UNDER THE TREATY BY CONFERRING AUTHORITY ON SOME OTHER BODY 
This was first stated in the findings on the Motunui claim, and confirmed in subsequent reports. 21 
As stated in the Manukau report: 
" ... we do not find it necessary to question [the Aucklancf Harbour Board's] particular acts except insofar as they relate to the nature of its statutory jurisdiction .... The first question is whether the Crown has a responsibility in terms of the Treaty. The question is then whether the statutory parameters prescribed for others in defining that responsibility are adequate having regard to the principles of the Treaty. It follows that the Crown cannot divest itself of its Treaty obligations or confer an inconsistent jurisdiction on others. It is not any act or omission of the [t,uckland Harbour] Board t~at is justiciable_ but any omiss~on of the Crown to provide a proper assurance of its Treaty promises when vestmg any responsibility in the Board." 22 
19 WAIHEKE, pp. 74-84 
20 ORAKEI, pp. 144, 147 
21 MOTUNUI, pp. 65, WAIHEKE, p. 74, MANUKAU, p. 99, ORAKEI, p. 136 22 MANUKAU. p. 99 
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The Tribunal found in the Orakei report that this principle extended to the vesting of 
responsibility in the Native land Court, and in the Mangonui report found that it extended to 
the laying down of rules tor local authorities and the Planning Tribunal. 23 
8 THE CROWN OBLIGATION TO LEGALLY RECOGNISE TRIBAL 
RANGA TIRATANGA 
In the Mangonui report, the Tribunal first addressed this point in detail in the context of 
whether Ngati Kahu had been prejudiced in their ability to present their veiws and have them 
accepted in the planning process. The Tribunal noted that a major impediment to tribal 
participation was the Crown's failure to legally recongise tribal authorities, a duty required 
under Article II of the Treaty. 
"It ought not to be forgotten that the Treaty was with ·tribes, being signed at 
different places and times by persons on their behalf . ... It was also clear in the 
Maori text and in the statements made at the time, that traditional mechanisms 
for tribal controls would continue to be respected and maintained. 
The main difficulty is that they were not. On the contrary, as the Orakei Report 
makes clear, policies were introduced over a century ago to put an end to tribal 
powers. 
Criticism that a tribe has failed to object is largely to blame the victim of the historic 
process for its current condition. The nub of the problem is in the omission of the 
Crown to recognise the tribal position and to provide the legal foundation and 
resources for tribes to contribute more fully to local affairs and to take all 
necessary steps for the protection of tribal interests.· 2' 
9 THE COURTESY OF EARLY CONSULTATION 
In the Manukau report, the Tribunal noted that: · 
"Consultation can cure a number of problems. A failure to consult may be seen 
as an affront to the standing of the indigenous tribes and lead to a confrontational 
stance. Admittedly some values and traditions are not negotiable but the areas 
for compromise remain wide .... 
To achieve a reasonable compromise it is preferable that there be consultaUon 
with the tribe rather than have the tribe resort to objection processes, or even 
protests and demonstrations. It would help if the conduct of the parties were 
related to planning procedures so that the Tribunal could adjourn proceedings 
and require discussion and a search for a settlement. • 
25 
In the Mangonui report, the Tribunal stated that: 
"Even at the outset there is a Maori complaint that the opportunity to oe involved 
is merely by an objection procedure which operates after the local authority's 
plans have been drawn and publicised. The procedure is available to the public 
23 ORAKEI, p. 136, MANGONUI, p. 4 
24 MANGONUI, p. 47 
25 MANUKAU, pp. 119, 125 
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as a whole. The tribes were given a special status by the Treaty however, and the objection procedures are often inconsistent with their ways, compelling a confrontational stance. 
The complaint is valid in our view but not because there is a duty to consult in all cases. It is the prior opportunity to discuss that is most especially wanting. Early discussions build better understandings in an area of cultural contact where the potential for conflict is high. Agreements may not be reached but new insights may be obtained and the subsequent debate may at least be better informed. 
Nevertheless it is as wrong to blame the Council if Ngati Kahu were consulted too late as it is to discredit Ngati Kahu if their objections were not made sooner. There 'is a decided lack of structure by which to determine the proper tribal members to deal with, or by which an authoritative tribal position can be obtained. The Crown, in our view, has much work to do to complete its Treaty undertakings. It must provide a legally recognisable form of tribal rangatiratanga or management, a rangatiratanga that the Treaty promised to uphold." 26 
10 TINO RANGATIRATANGA INCLUDES MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES AND OTHER TAONGA ACCORDING TO MAORI CULTURAL PREFER-ENCES 
The Motunui decision first sums this up as the full import of te tino rangatiratanga. 21 The Kaituna decision notes this same premise when it determines that traditional rights of ownership are part of the 'taonga Maori' guaranteed in the Treaty and carry with them the free and uninterrupted right to fish and gather in their traditional areas without impositions on their cultural and spiritual values from pollution. In the Manukau report the Tribunal stated that 'te tino rangatiratanga' in the Treaty means 'full authority status and prestige with regard to their possessions and interests', and that: 
"The protection of fisheries must accord with the Maori perception of those fisheries. It must be recognised that those disruption of fisheries that offend cultural or spiritual values, as for example the discharge of animal wastes to the waters of the fishery is as offensive as a physical disruption that reduces the quantity or quality of the catch ... there must be regard for the cultural values of the possessor." 28 
The Orakei report reiterates this point and notes that: 
"In recognising the 'tino rangatiratanga' over their lands the Queen was acknowl-edging the right of the Maori people for as long as they wished, to hold their lands in accordance with longstanding custom on a tribal and communal basis." 29 
• 
26 MANGONUI, pp. 4-5 
27 MOTUNUI, pp. 60, 63 
28 MANUKAU, p. 95 
29 ORAKEI, pp. 134-135 
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11 'TAONGA' INCLUDES ALL VALUED RESOURCES AND INTANGIBLE 
CULTURAL ASSETS 
The Tribunal has noted in the majority of its reports that taonga means 'all things highly prized' 
by Maori and this includes tangibles such as fishing grounds, harbours and foreshores, and 
intangibles such as the Maori language and the mauri or 'life-force' of a river. 
30 
12 THE PRINCIPLE OF CHOICE: MAORI, PAKEHA AND BICUL TURAL 
OPTIONS 
In the Muriwhenua report, the Tribunal considered the rights guaranteed to Maori in both a 
tribal context (Article II} and a personal context (Article Ill}: 
"The Treaty provided an effective option to Maori to deveiop along customary 
lines and from a traditional base, or to assimilate into a new way. Inferentially it 
offered a third alternative, to walk in two worlds. That same option is open to all 
people, is currently much in vogue and may represent the ultimate in partnership. 
But these are options, that is to say, it was not intended that the partner's choices 
could be forced. 
The historical record suggests Maori have consistently sought to uphold tribal 
ways against policies directed to amalgamation . . . but there is not certainty that 
that preference would be maintained if the forces of amalgamation were re-
moved. 
But the tribal right is also upheld. The individual, as a British subject, has the same 
rights (and duties) as anyone else in pursuing individual employment or gain. This 
may reduce the tribal need but does not necessarily displace it. " 
3 ' 
30 MOTUNUI, p. 59, KA/TUNA. p. 17, MANUKAU, pp. 93-95, TE REO MAORI, pp. 28·29, 
ORAKEI, p. 134 
31 MURIWHENUA, p. 195 
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APPENDJXK-
PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY OF WA/TANG/ AS 
DEFINED BY THE COUflT OF APPEAL' {1987) 
The Court of Appeal in seeking to define the 'principles' of the Treaty included in its source 
documents reports of the Waitangi Tribunal, the lists of Treaty principles submitted by the 
parties to the case (see Appendix L), the Maori Affairs Bill then before Parliament, and 
affidavits and other materials submitted to the Court. 
Justice Somers observed that: · 
"The principles of the Treaty must I think be the same today as they were when 
it was signed in 1840. What has changed are the circumstances to which those 
principles are to apply. At its making all lay in the future. Now much, claimed to 
be in breach of the principles and of the Treaty itself, lies in the past. Those signing 
the Treaty must have expected its terms would be honoured. It did not provide for 
what was to happen if, as has occurred, its terms were broken." ' 
And that: 
HA breach of a Treaty provision must in my view be a breach of the principles of 
the Treaty. " 2 
Justice Casey stated that in creating legislation that referred to 'principles' rather than 'terms 
or provisions' of the Treaty, Parliament provided for the Treaty's terms to be: 
~ .. understood in the light of the fundamental concepts underlying them. [This] 
calls for an assessment of the relationship the parties hoped to create by and 
reflect in that Document, and an enquiry into the benefits and obligations involved 
in applying its language in today's changed conditions and expectations in light 
of that relationship." 3 
1 THE ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY IN EXCHANGE FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF RANGATIRATANGA 
I 
Justice Cooke observed that the ·spirit' rather than the strict text of the Treaty should be 
considered, and that the basic terms of the Treaty bargain were: 
" ... that the Queen was to govern and the Maoris were to be her subjects; in return 
their chieftainships and possessions were to be protected, but sales of land to the 
Crown could be negotiated. These aims are partly conflicting." ' 
• 
All citations from New Zealand Court of Appeal, The Treaty of Waitangi in the Court of Appeal (N_ew 
Zealand Maori Council and Latimer v Attorney General and others, 6 NZAR 353), Government Pnnt, 
June 1987. 
1 Somers J, p. 20 
2 Somers J, p. 21 
3 Casey J, p. 16 
4 Cooke P, pp. 34-35 
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Justice Richardson considered that: 
"There is ..• one overarching prlnclpla ... that considered in the context of the 
SOE Act, the Treaty of Waltangl must be viewed as a solemn compact between 
two identified parties, the Crown snd the Maori, through which the colonisation 
of New Zealand was to become possible. For Its part the Crown sought legitimacy 
from the indigenous people for Its acquisition of sovereignty and in return it gave 
certain guarantees. ,. • 
2 THE TREATY REQUIRES A PARTNERSHIP AND mE DUTY TO ACT 
REASONABLY AND IN GOOD FAITH 
Justice Cooke noted that: • 
'The Treaty signified a partnership be'tween races ... . " 
and that: 
"utmost good faith ... is the characteristic obligation of partnership. " 6 
Justice Richardson noted that the •compact' entered into by the signing of the Treaty: 
" ... called for the prot.ectfon by the Crown of both Maori interests and British 
interests and rested on the premise that each party would act reasonably and in 
good faith toward the other within their respective spheres .... 
There would be circumstances where satisfying the concerns and aspirations of 
one party could injure the other. If the Treaty was to be taken seriously by both 
parties each would have to act In good faith and reasonably towards the other . 
. . under the settled principles of equity as under our partnership laws, the 
obligation of good faith Is necessarily Inherent In such a basic compact as the 
Treaty of Waitangi. " 7 
~ustice Casey noted that to assert that partnership and the exercise of good faith was implicit 
in the relationship established by the Treaty was: 
"to do no more than assert the maintenance of the 'honour of the Crown' 
underlying all its treaty relationships." • 
In summing up the findings of the Court of Appeal, Justice Cooke noted that, approaching the 
case independently, they had all agreed that: · 
5 
6 
7 
8 
" ••• the principles [of the Treaty} require the Pakeha and Maori Treaty 
partners to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good 
faith. 
Richardson J, p. 15 
Cooke P, pp. 35-36 
Richardson J, pp. 34, 39 
Casey J, p. 17 
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That duty Is no light one. It Is Infinitely more than a formality. If a breach of 
the duty Is demonstrated at any time, the duty of the Court wl/1 be to Insist 
that It be honoured. " • · • 
3 THE FREEDOM OF THE CROWN TO GOVERN 
Justice Cooke noted that: 
'The principles of the Treaty do not authorise unreasonable restrictions on the 
right of a duly elected Government to follow its chosen policy. Indeed to try and 
shackle the Government unreasonably would itself be inconsistent with those 
principles. The test of reasonableness is necessarily a broad one and necessarily 
has to be applied by the Court in the end in a realistic way. The parties owe each 
other co-operation. n IO 
In addition, Justice Bis·son stated that: 
" ... it is in accordance with the principles of the Treaty that the Crown should 
provide laws and make related decisions for the community as a whole having 
regard to the economic and other needs of the day . . .. n " 
4 THE CROWN DUTY OF ACTIVE PROTECTION 
Justice Cooke accepted that the relationship between the Treaty partners created resp::m-
sibilities analagous to fiduciary (trusteeship or protectorate) duties, and that: 
"the duty of the Crown is not merely passive but extends to active protection of 
Maori people in the use of their lands and waters to the fullest extent 
practicable." 12 
5 CROWN DUTY TO REMEDY PAST BREACHES 
Justice Cooke commented on a proposed 'duty to remedy past breaches', saying that: 
" ... if the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim and recommends redress, the 
Crown should grant at least some form of redress, unless there are grounds 
justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in withholding it - which would be only in 
very special circumstances if ever." 13 
However, he did not wish to comment on whether the Crown should grant precisely the form 
of redress recommended by the Tribunal. 
• 
9 Cooke P, p. 44 
10 Cooke P, p. 40 
11 Bisson J, p. 25 
12 Cooke P, p. 37 
13 Cooke P, pp. 37-38 
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Justice Richardson noted that: 
" ... the protection accorded to land rights is a positive 'guarantee' on the part of 
the Crown. This means that, where grievances are established, the State for its 
part is required to take positive steps in reparation." " , . -
Justice Somers observed that: 
" ... the right of redress for breach . . . may fairly be described as a principle . . 
. . As in the law of partnership a breach by one party of his duty to the other gives 
rise to a right of redress so I think a breach of the terms of.the Treaty by one of 
its parties gives rise to a right of redress by the other - a fair and reasonable 
recognition of, and recompense for, the wrong that has occurred. That right is not 
justiciable in the courts but the claim to it can be submtled to the Waitangi 
Tribunal." 15 
The Court ruled that the Crown must devise a mechanism to ensure that in the transfer of 
lands from Crown control to State-Owned Enterprises the Maori partner's right of redress was 
not prejudiced. 
6 MAORI TO RETAIN CHIEFTAINSHIP (RANGATIRATANGA) OVER THEIR 
RESOURCES AND TAONGA AND TO HAVE ALL THE RIGHTS AND 
PRIVILEGES OF CITIZENSHIP 
This is implied from Articles II and Ill, and generally addressed in principle no. 1 above. As 
it was specifically noted by Justice Bisson: 
'The Maori Chiefs looked to the Crown for protection from other foreign powers, 
for peace and for law and order. They reposed their trust for these things in the 
Crown believing that they retained their own rangatiratanga and taonga. The 
Crown assured them of the utmost good faith in the matter in which their existing 
rights would be guaranteed and in particular guaranteed down to each individual 
Maori the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands which is the 
basic and most important principle of the Treaty in the context ol the case before 
this Court .... {also) . . . Her Majesty extended to the natives of New Zealand . 
. . all the rights and privileges of British subjects. " '6 
7 THE MAORI DUTY OF 'REASONABLE CO-OPERATION' 
Justice Cooke noted that: 
" ... the duty.to act reasonably and in the utmost good faith is not one-sided. For 
their part the Maori people have undertaken a duty of loyalty to the Queen, full 
acceptance of her Government through her responsible Ministers, and reason-
able co-operation. " 11 
14 Richardson J, p. 17 
15 Somers J, p. 22 
16 Bisson J, pp. 22-23 
17 Cooke P, p. 37 
~ 15 
8 ON WHETHER THE TREATY CREA TES A DUTY TO CONSULT 
• 
Justice Cooke noted that it was 'unworkable' to-lay down a duty to consult in an unqualified 
sense, but noted that for a change of such magnitude as the transfer of Crown lands to SOEs, 
the Crown: 
"although ... clearly entitled to decide on such a policy, as a reasonable Treaty 
partner it should take the Maori race into its confidence regarding the manner of 
implementation of the policy." •• 
Justice Richardson noted that: 
" ... honesty of purpose calls for an honest effort to ascertain the facts and to reach 
an honest conclusion." 19 
But that: 
" the notion of an absolute open-ended and formless duty to consult is 
incapable of practical fulfilment and cannot be regarded as implicit in the Treaty 
... [however) ... the responsibility of one treaty partner to act in good faith fairly 
and reasonably towards the other puts the onus on ... the Crown, when acting 
within its sphere to make an informed decision ... to be able to say it has had 
proper regard to the impact of the principles of the Treaty." 20 
He went on to note that ta gather the necessary information on Treaty implications, 'some' 
or 'extensive' consultations may be needed, but in other circumstances the Crown may 
already have the necessary information at hand. 
Justice Somers observed that: 
" ... while each side is entitled to the fullest good faith by the other, I would not 
go so far as to hold that each must consult with the other. Good faith does not 
require consultation although it is an obvious way of demonstrating its 
existence." 21 
• 
18 Cooke P, p. 38 
19 Richardson J, p. 39 
20 Richardson J, p. 40 
21 Somers J. p. 23 
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APPENDIXM-
Principles of the Treaty 8$ Defined by the Royal 
Commission on Social Policy (1988) 
"It is the covenant of the Treaty which establishes three fundamentals; partner-
ship, equality of peoples, and guarantee. Many Maori believe that these funda-
mentals must guide the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi. This understand-
ing may be controversial to many Pake ha. It emerges clearly however, from Maori 
int~rpretations of the Treaty texts, and their historical and contemporary perspec-
tives. 
The FUNDAMENTAL OF PARTNERSHIP referred initially to the relationship 
between Maori people and the British Queen and Crown. Later, the relationship 
changed to that between Maori and the Crown based in New Zealand (and thence 
all immigrants and settlers). It was to be a relationship of mutual respect between 
equal peoples. 
The rangatira sought a partnership for several reasons. Although numerically and 
militarily the stronger, the Maori wanted a system of law and order to govern the 
relationship between Maori and Pakeha. Many rangatira were also worried about 
the continuing conflicts between some iwi. Further they wanted continued access 
to internal and overseas trade and new technology, and independence from other 
colonial powers. 
The FUNDAMENTAL OF EQUALITY OF PEOPLES refers to the understanding 
that Maori and Pakeha would have equality and live in such a way that mutual 
respect and integrity were maintained. 
The FUNDAMENTAL GUARANTEE refers to the promise that the Queen would 
ensure that Maori were treated and protected as British subjects. At the same 
time the retention of Maori fishing grounds, forests, lands and other properties 
including culture would be guaranteed." 
(Source: Royal Commission on Social Policy, 'The April Report', Volume Ill, part 1, p. 103) 
• 
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Appendix C 
The general principles of the Treaty which the Tribunal 
considered were relevant to the Muriwhenua claim, having regard 
to New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1987] INZLR 
641, and the objects and intentions already referred to, were 
stated to be threefold 
(i) The principle of protection. 
"Maori were protected in their lands and fisheries 
(English text) and in the retention of their tribal 
base (Maori text). In the context of the overall 
scheme for settlement, the fiduciary undertaking of 
the Crown is much broader and amounts to an 
assurance that despite settlement Maori will 
survive and because of it they would also 
"progress" . 
.... "The essential point was that the Treaty both 
assured Maori survival and envisaged their advance, 
but to achieve that in Treaty terms, the Crown had 
not merely to protect those national resources 
Maori might wish to retain but to assure the 
retention of a sufficient share from which they 
could survive and profit, and the facility to fully 
exploit them". (page 194). 
(ii) The principle of mutual benefit. 
"Both parties expected to gain from the Treaty, the 
Maori from new technologies and markets, non Maori 
from acquisition of settlement rights and both from 
cession of sovereignty to a supervisory state 
power .... 
.... neither partner in our view can demand their 
own benefits if there is not also an adherence to 
reasonable state objectives of common benefit. It 
ought not to be forgotten that there were pledges 
(iii) 
on both sides". (pages 194 - 195). 
The principle of options. 
"Neither text prevents individual Maori from 
pursuing a direction of personal choice". (page 
195), i.e., there is an option to Maori to develop 
along customary lines and from traditional base, or 
to assimilate into a new way or to walk in two 
worlds. But the tribal right is also upheld. 
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PRINCIPLES FoR CROWN AcTION ON 
THE TREATY OF WAITANGI 
P RINCIPLE 1 
The Principle of Government The Kauxmatanga Principle 
The Government has the right to govern and to make laws. 
P RINCIPLE 2 
/t-(',~\1<. 0 
The Principle of Self-Management The Rangatirafanga Principle 
The iwi have the right to organise as iwi, and, under the law, to control their 
resources as their own. 
P RINCIPLE 3 
The Principle of Equalily 
All New Zealanders are equal before the law. 
P RINCIPLE 4 
ThtPrinc~k~Rea~MbkCoo~raoon 
Both the Government and the iwi are obliged to accord each other resonable 
cooperation on major issues of common concern. 
P RINCIPLE 5 
Tht Principlt '1{ Rtdrrss 
The Government is responsible for providing effective processes for the 
resolution of grievances in the expectation that reconciliation can occur. 
The five Principles are detailed in the following pages together with a commentary. 
I I 
I 
5.6 The Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi 
It must be remembered that the function of the Tribunal is to irwestigate whether the 
actions complained of are inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty, not with 
either or both of its two texts. The phrase "the principles of the Treaty" is likewise 
used in other legislation, such as the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986, the 
Environment Act 1986 and the Conservation Act 1987. It is therefore necessary to 
attempt to determine what are the principles of the Treaty. 
Professor Orr has recently made a very helpful analysis of the decisions which 
have discussed these principles. He prefaces his conclusion with the important 
point that it is not possible to formulate a comprehensive or complete set of Treaty 
principles. The Tribunal has articulated only those principles which it has thought 
re levant to the cases before it, adopting a case by case approach. The Court of 
Appeal did likewise in the Maori Council case. Moreover it is undesirable to 
attempt to formulate a definitive or exclusive set of principles because the Treaty is 
a living document which calls to be interpreted and applied not simply as at 1840 
but in a contemporary setting. 
Having made these observations, Professor Orr identified the following principles of 
the Treaty. 
1. The gift to the Crown of kawanatanga (the right to govern) was in exchange 
for the protection by the Crown of Maori rangatiratanga (full authority) . 
2. There are limits on the authority of the Crown to govern. 
3. There is a tribal right of self-regulation. 
4. The Crown has the right of pre-emption and reciprocal duties. 
5. The Crown has an obligation actively to protect Maori Treaty rights. 
,:: I'."~ :· • • ' : .. {~ ' • •' ... .. 
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6. The Treaty signifies a partnership and requires· the Pakeha and Maori 
partners to act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good 
faith. 
7. The Crown has a duty to remedy past breaches of the Treaty. 
The last of these principles raises the interesting question of whether the failure of 
the Crown without reasonable justification to give effect to the substance of a 
Tribunal recommendation may in itself constitute a further breach of the Treaty. In 
the words of Sir Robin Cooke at pages 664-5 of the Maori Council case: 
"A duty to remedy past breaches was spoken of. I would accept that 
suggestion, in the sense that if the Waitangi Tribunal finds merit in a claim 
and recommends redress, the Crown should grant at least some form of 
redress, unless there are grounds justifying a reasonable Treaty partner in 
withholding it - which would be only in very special circumstances, if ever. 
As mentioned earlier, I prefer to keep open the question whether the Crown 
ought ordinarily to grant any precise form of redress that may be indicated by 
the Tribunal". 
What is clear is that the development and redefinition of the principles of the Treaty 
will be a ~(?_ntinuing and difficult task for the Tribunal and the Courts. 
s.z The Future 
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, I believe that in recent years the Tribunal has 
performed a valuable role by providing a vehicle for Maori claims to be researched, 
a forum for grievances to be expressed and responded to by the Crown and a 
source of recommendations to Government as to possible solutions. In doing so 
the Tribunal has at all times been conscious of, and has on many occasions 
referred to, the necessity to ensure that in attempting to remedy the injustices of the 
past we do not create new injustices. 
We are at a critical point in the history of race relations in this country. On the one 
hand, Maori expectations that long standing grievances will be addressed have 
now been raised by the recent recognition of some of those claims by Parliament, 
the Courts and the Tribunal. On the other hand, it would be naive to pretend that 
there is not a developing backlash among other sectors of the community against 
what is seen as preferential treatment for Maori. Meanwhile the rhetoric of 
extremists on both sides is producing emotive responses both for and against their 
position. 
The Tribunal may be able to assist in reconciling the present widely divergent 
views within the community. Hopefully it can do so by exposing breaches of the 
Treaty which have occurred over the years and making practical and realistic 
recommendations to compensate for these breaches. At the same time the 
Tribunal must identify those claims which are not well-founded or where relief is not 
appropriate. 
In order to carry out its functions successfully the Tribunal must have the confidence 
of the country as a whole. It requires in particular the support of the legal 
profession, su-pport which I am sure will be readily forthcoming. 
Appendix F 
Summary of Treaty principles identified by S Kenderdine in 
paper at The Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar, April 1989. 
1. The Principle of Partnership. 
2. The Principle of Reciprocal Obligations. 
3. The Principle of Active Protection. 
4. The Principle of Honest Effort to Ascertain the Facts. 
S. The Principle of the Right of Redress for Breach. 
6. The Principle of Mutual Benefit. 
7. The Principle of Options. 
8. The Principle of Consent. 
9. The Principle of the Maori Right to Exercise 
Rangatiratanga (Tribal self-regulation). 
10. The Principle of the Right to Govern Without Undue 
Shackles. 
11. The Principle of the Crown Guarantee to Individual 
Maori of full exclusive and undisturbed possession of 
their lands. 
12. The Principle of Negotiation for Interference with 
Rights. 
.L'.H.E rnPE.R.ATrvES OF MAORI 
CONSULTATION 
8 
What is the "Why?" of Maori Consultation? Why should 
we consult? There are a number of reasons. They 
vary in substance and Importance In different situations. 
Collectively they corn prise an imperative for effective 
government in contemporary New Zealand. 
Some of these reasons are: 
Statutory requirements 
Numerous statutes now contain reference to the Treaty 
of Waitangi. These typically enjoin us to pursue the 
"principles of the Treaty" or to conduct our business in 
"accordance" with them. Even if they don't there are 
legal decisions emerging steadily which inevitably lead 
us back to the Treaty in some way. It Is so basic to our 
developing law that It's hard to avoid. 
What are these "Principles of the Treaty"? The Court of 
Appeal has been at some pains to define them In the 
Maori Council Case 1987. It defines the central 
principle of the Treaty as that of "Partnership" and then 
goes on to describe the Maori-Crown relationship in 
partnership terms. One of the primary duties between 
partnerslsthatofConsultatlon. 
The Common Law 
There are a variety of decisions emerging in the 
Common law which are as compulsive as statute. 
These inciude fisheries and resource law reliant on the 
principle of aboriginal rights, the appeal decisions in 
planning law turning on the application of the "National 
Importance" provisions, and decisions turning on 
particular provision for the Maori interest in other 
legislation. Some of these decisions reverse or modify 
long established interpretation. 
Thrust of general Government policy 
There Is a clearly discernible thrust in general 
Government policy which is inclusive of Maori interest or 
representation alongside that of women and other 
Polynesian people. This is evident particularly, but by 
no means exclusively, in the social sector. 
This thrust suggests it is prudent to behave inclusively 
towards Maori and Maori interests and concerns. It 
does not enjoin us to "tokenism" simply to gain 
acceptance of initiatives or for other reasons. However, 
it does suggest administrative behaviour which is 
' regularly reviewed and tests for its inclusiveness of a 
Maori dimension. This review process should be driven 
by pragmatic considerations of effectiveness rather than 
moralistic aims. 
Pragmatism 
Maori are a significant and growing component in New 
Zealand society. They have a greatly increased 
presence In our national life which is unlikely to diminish. 
Past relative deprivation and disadvantage pose a major 
social and political challenge for the future. Meeting that 
challenge requires the active involvement and 
participation of Maori. This cannot be achieved without 
effective and honest consultation. To seek to ignore or 
avoid the Maori dimension in government administration 
Is unwise because Maori resistance or hostility has an 
increasing capacity to frustrate policy fulfilment in the 
medium and longer term. Effective Maori consultation is 
practical administrative behaviour. 
9 
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BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND 
Order of Reference 
The White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand was referred to 
the Justice and Law Reform Committee by resolution of Parliament on 
9 October 1985 for investigation and report. 
Committee Personnel 
~embers of the Justice and Law Reform Committee for this inquiry 
during the 41 st and 42nd Parliaments were: 
Bill Dillon (Chairman) 
Richard Northey 
Trevor Mallard (from commencement until 15 July 1987) 
Jenny Kirk (from 23 September 1987) 
Paul East (from commencement until 11 April 1986 and again from 
5 February 1987) · 
Hon. J. K. Mclay (11 April 1986 to 5 February 1987) 
Katherine O'Regan (from commencement to 15 July 1987) 
Mr R. J. S. Munro (from 23 September 1987) 
Parliamentary Staff assisting the Committee were: 
Audrey Butcher, Committee Secretary · 
G~rry Rud~ , Committee Clerk (from commencement until August 1987) 
Alison Carlin , Assistant Committee Secretary (from 13 April 1988) 
Kirsty. Burnett , Assistant Committee Secretary (from September 1987 
until February 1988) 
Introduction 
The Committee .ma?e an .inte.rim rep.ort on the Wh ite Paper describing 
the progress on its invest1gat1on which was tabled in the House on 
9 July 1987. The Committee has now completed its investigation. ~ 
Recommendation 
In its report to the Justice and Law Reform Committee on the White 
Pa~er the Department of Justice discussed a number of options for a bill 
of rights . 
The first. option was the White Paper draft , that is, an entrenched 
statute having the effect of supreme law and providing for enforcement 
by Jhe .cou.rt~ of the e~umerated civil and political rights . The second 
o~t1on 1s _simila~ but with some amendments to the listed rights. The 
third option discussed in the Department's report was for the 
entrenching of the International Covenant on Civil and Pol itical Rights. 
A large majority of the submissions did not favour th is type of 
approach at all . The power given to the judiciary by the White Paper 
thou g ht to entai l from ele cted re presenta tives 01 tne peop \e wno were 
directly accountable to them to the judiciary who were appointed and 
held offi ce unti l their retirement. 
The Committee considers that there is a limited public understanding 
of and support for the role of the judiciary under a bill of rights . In coun-
tries which do have a bill of rights the judiciary does not usually see it as 
their function to thwart the wishes of the elected representatives by 
striking down legislation without a very good reason . In fact they rarely 
exercise the power. Nonetheless, the Committee has concluded that 
New Zealand is not yet ready, if it ever will be, for a fully fledged bill of 
rights along the lines of the White Paper draft. 
The Committee has however concluded that the bill of rights proposal 
should not lapse. The Committee considers that there is substantial 
merit in a bill of rights . New Zealand is without some of the checks and 
balances of other similar jurisdictions. A bill of rights can provide 
valuable checks on the actions of the Executive. The debate on the 
White Paper has also highlighted that the community as a whole has 
very little knowledge of fundamental human rights issues, what human 
rights are worth specific protection in the New Zealand context, and 
about our constitutional system. A bill of rights could have great educa-
tive and moral value and help fill this gap. 
Nonetheless, the Committee considers that it is necessary to adopt a 
fairly cautious approach. The Committee accordingly recommends ( 
the introduction of a bill of rights which is an ordinary statute, that 
is, not a supreme law and not entrenched. Provision should be made 
for the operation of the bill of rights to be monitored by a select commit-
tee of Parliament . Further, the bill of rights could give guidance to the 
courts about the interpretation of legislation in light of the rights set out 
in the bill of rights . Third, the existing administrative processes for the 
scrutiny of legislative proposals could be strengthened. The bill of rights 
could require the Attorney-General to certify on the fai::e of a bill when 
the Attorney-General considers that the bill derogates from the bill of 
rights , and the select committee of Parliament to take similar action and 
report to the House on provisions in any Bill that appeared contrary to 
the principles and specific articles in the Bill of Rights. 
It has to be acknowledged that an ordinary statute will be less power-
ful than the draft bill set out in the White Paper. It could be amended or 
overridden by another ordinary statute. However, it could still provide 
some of the necessary checks and balances and perform an educative 
function . It would also meet the principal argument made against the 
White Paper draft, that is, that it involves an unwarranted transfer of 
power from Parliament to the judiciary. 
A more detailed outline of the features of the bill recommended by the 
Committee is attached as Appendix A. 
The bill outlined in Appendix A substantially follows the White Paper 
draft. However, the Committee would like to draw particular attention to 
omission o r tne Art,c tes rela ting lo the Treaty o r W ai ta ngi. Art icle 4 of the 
White Paper draft recognised and affirmed the rights of the Maori people 
under the Treaty. Those rights therefore would have become enforce-
able by the courts in the same way as the other rights in the draft bill. 
One reason for including the Treaty is that it must be seen as an essen-
tial part of any supreme constitutional law which might be enacted,..8.§_ 
the bill recommended by the Committee would not be supreme law this 
reason no longer applies. Indeed, to include the Treaty might suggest 
that it is no more than an ordinary statute. Further, the Committee notes 
that questions about compliance with the Treaty are increasingly being 
addressed effectively by individual statutes, the Waitangi Tribunal, and 
the courts . For these reasons the Committee recommends against 
including an equivalent to Article 4 of the White Paper draft. 
The second of the features which the Committee would like to com-
ment on is the inclusion of fundamental social and economic rights. 
Those rights are obviously as important to New Zealanders as the civil 
and political rights in the White Paper draft and a number of submis-
sions recommended their inclusion. However, there are great difficulties 
in dealing with such rights in a judicially enforceable supreme law such 
as the White Paper draft. With a bill that is not judicially enforceable 
there are much fewer problems about incorporating such rights in the 
Bill . In Appendix A the Committee suggests that some of these major 
specified rights could be included . It is recognised that effective exer-
cise of civil and political rights depends on securing an adequate 
standard of living, housing, health care and education. 
Conclusion 
By a majority, we recommend that the Government draft and 
introduce into the House a Bill of Rights along the lines recom-
mended in this report in time for it to be considered, and if 
enacted, come into force during the term of this Parliament. The 
Opposition Committee members oppose this recommendation . 
FEATURES OF BILL OF RIGHTS ENACTED AS AN ORD\NAR'< 
STATUTE 
The drafting of the bill outlined below will of course require further 
scrutiny. Bearing in mind this qualification the Committee considers that 
the bill could be drafted along the following lines: 
1. Introductory Clauses 
The Preamble in the White Paper draft would form a useful basis with 
amendments consequential on the fact that the bill would not be 
supreme law; the inclusion of a reference to social and economic rights; 
and on the omission of Article 4 relating to the Treaty of Waitangi; while 
specifically acknowledging the continuing importance of the Treaty of 
Waitangi and the multi-cultural nature of New Zealand society. 
2. General 
The bill could then incorporate Articles 2 and 3 of the White Paper 
draft with an amendment to Article 2 consequential on the fact that the 
bill would not be supreme law. 
3. Civil and Political Rights 
The bill could contain in one Part a list of fundamental civil and politi-
cal rights . The list could be based on the White Paper draft with amend-
ments made in response to the comments made in the submissions to 
the Justice and Law Reform Committee. Adopting also many of the sug-
gestions for amendments to that draft made in the Report of the Depart-
ment of Justice, and reordering the articles in a more appropriate priority 
order and more logical grouping of categories, this part of the Bill would 
be redrafted along the following lines: 
PART 00 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Life and Security of the Person 
1. Right not to be deprived of life 
No one shall be deprived of life except on such grounds, and, where 
applicable, in accordance with such procedures, as are established by 
law and are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. 
[Marginal note only altered, formerly Article 14 of the original White 
Paper draft.) 
2. No torture or cruel treatment 
(1) Everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment. 
(2) Every person has the right not to be subjected to medical or 
scientific experimentation without that person's consent. 
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